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FIXING CAPITAL GAINS: SYMMETRY,
CONSISTENCY AND CORRECTNESS
N THE TAXATION OF FINANCIAL
INSTRUMENTS
ABSTRACT
An enormous amount of effort and ingenuity has been addressed to patching holes in the
income tax attributable to realization accounting, A classic instance of the problem is the headaches
created by capital gains, whereby the taxpayer can choose to postpone recognition of gain and
accelerate recognition of loss (a practice known as cherry picking). Nowhere are the inconsistencies
that result fi-omrealization accounting more pronounced than in the taxation of financial instruments,
especially “derivatives” of familiar securities. This paper sets forth the requirements for income
measurement rules based on realization that are “linear” in the sense that doubling a person’s
transactions will double the taxable income, and adding one set of transactions to another will result
in the sum of the associated income. Under present realization conventions, the tax law cannot be
linear because there would then be no limit on tax arbitrage profit via variations on borrowing with
deductible interest and lending tax exempt. To focus on the principles, the paper assumes
transactions are costless. In that case, it is shown that to deal with the intertemporal aspect of the
problem requires virtually universal imputation of taxable interest income to basis (the taxpayer’s
cost of an asset). To deal with the risk aspect of the problem (lock-in and cherry picking) requires
simply that the effective rate of tax on gains and losses be the same (not necessarily equal to the rate
on inter-temporal returns). A new method is proposed that satisfies the requirements for linear
income measurement. It is shown that the retroactive taxation of gain devised by Alan Auerbach
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I. Introduction
This paper was stimulated by reading “Financial Contract Innovation and Income
Tax Policy,” by Alvin C. Warren (1993), dealing with certain fundamental problems in
income tax accounting for financial instruments. Subsequent browsing in the burgeoning
literature to which Warren’s paper contributes (see Bibliography) has shown me there is a
much about the income tax treatment of financial instruments that I do not know, Some
of what is set forth in this paper will be in the nature of review for serious thinkers on this
subject. I believe, however, there is something new in my conclusions.
In his paper Warren develops the difficulties created for the income tax system by
its reliance on a combination of different rules applicable to “fixed” and “contingent”
returns to the holders of financial instruments. The fixed returns are taxed according to a
generalization of the long-standing treatment of periodic interest. That is, there is
Professor of Economics and Public ~airs, Princeton University, Adjunct Professor, New
York University School of Law, Research Associate, National Bureau of Economic
Research and Adjunct Scholar, the American Enterprise Institute. This is a revised version
of a paper presented to the Tax Law Review Colloquium on Financial Instruments, New
York University, New York, May 22, 1995and will be published in a forthcoming issue of
the Tax Law Review. Comments of colloquium participants and subsequent helpful
comments from Alan Auerbach, Joseph Bankman, Louis Kaplow, Mark Gergen, Diane
Ring, Robert Scarborough, Deborah Schenk, Daniel Shaviro, and Alvin Warren are
gratefully acknowledged. In addition, I would like to thank the John M. Olin Foundation
for support of the research underlying this paper. Views expressed are my own and
should not be taken as representing any institution.2
inclusion in the taxable income of the holder and a deduction by the issuer of the
equivalent of periodic interest payments, using a “yield to maturity” calculated from the
instrument as the basis for specifying the applicable interest rate. The contingent returns
are taxed upon a realization event, with the difference between cost basis and realized
amount included in the income of the holder (deducted if it is a loss). Warren calls the
first the “yield to maturity” approach and the second the “wait and see” approach. A third
approach, discussed by Warren, is the mark-to-market method. For the case of an
instrument that is held throughout a period during which it gives rise to no cash flows, the
holder includes in income the increase in the instrument’s market value over the period.
(If there is a cash flow during the period, it is added to the increase in market value. This
principle would apply equally to asset and liability sides. For an instrument with a party
and counterpart, to each inclusion by one party would correspond a deduction by the
counterpart.)
The main challenge Warren sees is in the taxation of contingent returns
Postponement of income until realization gives rise to familiar problems due to a
differential between the treatment of accruing and deferred income. Having convincingly
demonstrated the limitations of the established approaches to dealing with this differential,
Warren offers in conclusion the following provocative observation:
Serious consideration should [therefore] be given to reducing the
differential by taxing at least some contingent returns in accordance with a
formula, such as the retrospective allocation of gain or the imputation of
interest at a standard rate. Although not without precedent, development
of a formulaic approach would be a significant change in the concept of
realization, Such a change maybe necessary, for the traditional concept no
longer seems adequate to deal with innovative financial contracts.3
In this paper I take yet another look at the taxation of financial instruments. To
isolate certain income-measurement problems, I focus on a world with no transactions
costs. This setting throws into particular relief that the critical difficulty is dealing
consistently with the intertemporal aspects of transactions. This is well known in a sense;
timing is central to an income tax. But I shall argue that the difficulties are more serious
than is commonly realized, and the constraints on workable rules in the no-transactions-
cost world are extremely confining. Imputation of interest (at a specific, if not a
“standard” rate) is the key to isolating the timing problem. By contrast, there are
surprising degrees of freedom in dealing consistently with contingency.
Original issue discount (OID) bonds provide a usefil illustration of what I mean by
the purely intertemporal problem, since taxing them does not obviously raise issues of
contingency or collateral issues, such as character, The yield-to-maturity method of
assigning taxable income attempts to produce consistency between the consequences of
holding an OID bond and holding an otherwise similar instrument that generates periodic
interest payments. If we take as the standard the mark-to-market method, which does not
depend at all on transactions, the yield-to-maturity method may accomplish a reasonable
approximation in practice. But to understand or deal with more complex cases, it is
helpfil to be clear that, strictly speaking, neither the yield to maturity nor the other
familiar rules that rely on either actual or imputed cash flows between parties to a financial
instrument precisely solve the intertemporal consistency problem, This is partly because
the yield to maturity is typically an amalgam of the shorter-term interest rates that
represent the “proper” measure. It is also because longer-term instruments almost
inevitably incorporate some degree of contingency.4
As I shall argue, to eliminate differentials in taxation of the purely intertemporal
effects of financial instruments in a transactions-based system, one needs to start with the
taxation of one basic set of instruments that accomplishes exchange of dollars at one time
for dollars at another time. I take as what I regard as the natural choice the taxation of
simple, one-period loans that have no risk of default. 1 The taxation of these elementary
transactions then restricts the possibilities for taxing other transactions without
introducing “complications,” Chief among the complications are rules such as the limit on
the deductibility of realized capital losses, which I describe as violations of linearity (to be
explained shortly).
Accordingly, my approach in this paper is to examine the restrictions on the
income measurement rules applicable to financial instruments implied by the requirement
that the rules be linear, More precisely, I focus on the rules that must apply to a “bilateral
financial instrument ,“ I mean by this term a bilateral contract that consists entirely in the
specification of cash payments to be made by a party to a counterpart. So, for present
purposes, an ordinary bond is a bilateral financial instrument but a property lease is not,
since the latter provides that one party deliver certain services in return for cash payments
by the other party.
The reason for restricting attention to bilateral financial instruments is not that I
believe it would make sense for thereto be a special regime for them, On the contrary, I
take for granted that whatever income measurement rules exist should apply as well to the
restricted class of transactions in bilateral financial instruments. Bilateral financial
1 Such instruments maybe subject to inflation risk, however, As I shall emphasize,5
instruments are the focus here because they provide the opportunity for the tax arbitrage
transactions that call forth complicating fiscal defenses,
In an income tax based on transactions, the consequence of a particular sequence
of transactions over time is a sequence of taxable income amounts.z The rules that
translate the transactions into taxable incomes have the property of lineari~ in the sense
used in this paper if, when applied to the combination of two sequences of transactions
(adding them together), they produce the combination (the period-by-period sum) of the
corresponding taxable income sequences. Similarly, if every element of a sequence of
transactions is multiplied by some number (doubling everything, for example), the
resulting sequence of taxable incomes is multiplied by the same number. In particular, if
everything is multiplied by negative one, the taxable income sequence is reversed as well,
rendering deductible losses taxable gains and taxable gains deductible losses.q
Linearity is a desideratum of a tidy tax system. Violations of linearity tend to
produce inefficiencies and anomolies, as when an investor is unable to deduct a loss that
has no tax motivation. Nonlinearities also typically imply a reward to carefil tax planning,
and add to tax complexity. The U, S. federal income tax rules incorporate many violations
of linearity, however. I use the limitation on the deductibility of capital losses as
representative. A taxpayer whose net capital losses in a given year exceed $3000 is
obliged to carry forward the excess, to be netted against possible fiture gains. Doubling
consistency, not correctness, is the objective.
2 A transaction may itself be more or less complex. So, for example, acquisition of a
discount bond gives rise under the rules to a sequence of increments to fiture taxable
income. If the bond is sold, the sequence is revised in a way specified by the rules.6
everything about the transactions of a taxpayer who is right at the $3000 capital loss limit
will result in a net $6000 loss. Since the extra loss cannot be deducted currently, the
consequence is generally that the taxable income will not be doubled, in violation of
linearity. Another example is the limitation on the deductibility of investment interest.
Adding some dividends to a person’s transactions will increase the tax due from a
taxpayer not up against the limitation, but will not increase the tax due from one who is.
As will become clear, if it is not obvious, both of these nonlinearities serve to bound tax
arbitrage profit opportunities that would not otherwise be self-limiting.4
In the interest of sharpening understanding, I work in this paper with some
extreme assumptions. I have mentioned the most significant extreme assumption I make,
that there are no transactions costs. Arguably, it is transactions costs that protect the
income tax from much more extensive tax arbitrage than currently occurs, Assuming them
away removes the protection and exposes the income measurement problems. I also
assume (perhaps this is implied by the absence of transactions costs) a taxpayer can
costlessly take any zero-value position, borrowing to buy a security, for example.
There is a practical as well as an analytical reason to investigate the fictionless
world, One of the most striking developments in financial markets in recent years has
been a steady decline in transactions costs, reflected in the proliferation of new
instruments, The paper thus can be read as exploring problems that we can expect to get
worse, absent redesign of the rules.
3 This definition is very close to Stmad’s (1994, p. 576).
1 For a comprehensive analysis of the role and effect of loss limitations to obstruct tax
arbitrage, see Scarborough (1993).7
A subtheme of the paper is correcties,s, about which I have two general points in
mind. First, it is quite possible for rules that fail to produce an accurate measure of a
period’s income (in the sense of change in accrued wealth) nevertheless to produce a
result that is economically equivalent to accurate measurement from the point of view of
the taxpayer, An example would be some sort of look-back calculation of interest accrued
on a discount bond, Second, it may be essential that income measurement rules involving
different sorts of instruments be consistently related to one another, even if the rules fail to
measure income correctly. The underlying program of most rule-writing for financial
instruments (for example, the treatment of original issue discount) can be described as
seeking consistent treatment with that applied to plain vanilla interest. But consistency in
this sense in the treatment of different financial instruments is not the same as correctness
of the treatment of any of them. Plain vanilla interest may be a poor approximation to the
real return on the associated asset.
The difference is due to intlation. It is conventionally accepted that modest
inflation -- 2% to 3% per year -- can safely be neglected in the tax system, But this
paper’s emphasis on the critical role of time, and not risk, invites the observation that the
real return to pure waiting (as opposed to risk-taking) in U. S. financial markets over the
past few decades has been about 0.5% per years If this is a reasonably close
approximation to the pure intertemporal return, a very modest income tax rate applied to
nominal interest of 2,5°/0to 3.5°/0renders the real, after-tax return negative. It is
5 This is the average real rate of return on U.S. Treasury bills. See R. G. Ibbotsen
Associates (1995).8
somewhat ironic that great effort is applied to assure that all transactions are treated
equally badly,
The most important instance in this paper of rules that produce a correct result (in
the sense of equivalence, from the taxpayer’s point of view, to taxing accruing wealth)
arises in connection with taxation of risky instruments, If the outcome of a risky situation
is a gain of $1 by one party to a financial instrument and an offsetting loss of $1 to the
counterpart, an accurate measure of wealth change would add $1 to the income of the
winner and subtract $1 from the income of the loser, I think most of the rule-writing
effort with regard to contingent returns seeks correctness in this sense. My conclusion is
that the objective is unimpofiant in the context of risk-taking because of the flexibility
people have to adjust their financial positions. It is impofiant that a taxpayer’s gains and
losses on a given asset be taxed at the same rate, but not necessarily at the rate applied to
other transactions. It is thus possible to identifi rules that are economically equivalent to
taxing a taxpayer’s change in wealth but make no pretense at producing a correct measure
of it.
The body of this paper is divided into four parts (preceded by this introduction and
followed by a brief conclusion). In Part II, I present a background discussion of the
concept of tax arbitrage and review Warren’s findings. In Part III, I focus narrowly on the
problem presented by time, in the absence of risk. Much recent writing, including
Warren’s paper, emphasizes the central role of risk. This emphasis is clearly justified. It
may, however, not be clear quite how time and risk interact to challenge the
implementation of an income tax. The object of Part III is then to restate the problems of
taxing purely intertemporal transactions. I found it desirable, and probably necessary, to9
write down my own version of this material in order to address with precision the problem
of dealing with contingency, The main conclusion that I reach in Part III that may be
somewhat new or controversial is the one already mentioned. Strictly speaking, there is
very little flexibility about the “right” way to tax intertemporal transactions. The yield to
maturity method, for example, is “wrong.” The practice of using the “applicable federal
rate” for imputing interest to positions of different maturity is another example of an
approach that is, strictly speaking, wrong. Taxation based on realization requires either
imputing interest to basis at the going rates during the holding period, or what amounts to
the same thing, imposing a tax on realization that treats the proceeds as having been
accumulated at the interest rates prevailing during the holding period. (I refer to the latter
approach as the Auerbach method, since Alan Auerbach spelled it out in a 1991 article.)
In Part IV, I suggest that the taxation of risk per se poses surprisingly few
problems, It does, however, upset the efficacy of the method of imputing interest to basis
as a way of perfecting a realization system, Instead, of the approaches that have been
considered, only the Auerbach method remains as a possibility.
In Part V, I describe an alternative approach to taxing contingent returns using
realization accounting. It eliminates any tax-induced timing advantages or disadvantages
from realization. The key idea is that the rate applicable to gains in excess of the current
interest rate may be set freely, but it must be set in advance of any information about the
extent of any such gains. As it turns out, the Auerbach method is a special case of the
alternative approach, which offers considerably greater flexibility for the design of policy,
The title of the paper suggests both reach, “fixing capital gains,” and narrowness
of focus on financial instruments. As I have indicated, financial instruments are central in10
the paper because they raise most sharply problems due to inconsistency in the taxation of
different forms of return. But, with provisos that I discuss in Part V, I believe that the
method I have devised for taxing contingent returns on financial instruments could be
extended to contingent returns generally.
II. Background
Tax Arbitrage Profit in Market Equilibrium
The term “arbitrage” refers to the activity of buying and selling the same thing in
different markets, and a profit results if the price paid to buy is below that received on the
sale (by enough to cover the costs of arranging the pair of transactions). One could mean
more than one thing by the term “tax arbitrage.”G For example, some would describe as
tax arbitrage, the activity of borrowing with deductible interest to purchase a business
asset that offers accelerated depreciation, In this paper the focus is on tax arbitrage using
financial instruments. The instrument itself specifies cash flows between the parties. An
opportunity for tax arbitrage profit exists when there is apair of instruments (or pair of
packages of instruments) that are identical in their cash flows but differ in the associated
flows of taxable income, Then, if the tax system is linear, by entering into exactly
offsetting positions in the two instruments, taxpayers may be able to reduce their taxes.
The opportunity for arbitrage profit of any kind is inconsistent with equilibrium.
So the potential for tax arbitrage must be eliminated by some combination of adjustments
in asset prices, changes in effective marginal tax rates (including changes resulting from
6 On the definition of tax arbitrage, Warren (1993, p. 471) cites Steuerle (1985), Bradford
(1980), and Warren (1985).11
such rules as limits on deductions, so that the marginal rate on an extra dollar of the
deduction in question is effectively zero) and increases in transactions costs.
A Canonical Problem: Discount Bonds
The tax treatment of a zero-coupon discount bond provides a handy canonical
example of tax arbitrage, In the old days, a cash basis taxpayer holding a zero-coupon
discount bond had no inclusion in taxable income until the bond paid off at maturity, at
which point the holder included the difference between the amount received and basis, the
amount paid for the bond. By contrast, the holder of a bond that pays interest currently
was, and still is, obliged to bring into taxable income the successive interest payments.
Consider the problem posed by this treatment of the two sorts of instruments. For
purposes of this discussion, assume all the taxpayers in question are on a cash basis. Also,
since the concern here is with timing, not character, assume no difference between
ordinary and capital gains rates.
In the absence of taxes, neglecting transactions costs (the cost of arranging the
arbitrage) and ignoring possible unpredictable variations in the short-term interest rates (to
which I return below), we know an investor who undertakes a sequence of investments in
short-term bonds paying ordina~ interest, always reinvesting the principal and interest,
can achieve exactly the same pattern of net period-by-period cash flows as the holder of
the zero-coupon discount bond. There are two important points to emphasize about the
equivalence between the two positions, the zero-coupon discount bond and the program
of investment in ordina~ one-period loans with reinvestment: First, with a little
cleverness, two parties could enter into an agreement to exchange one for the other in
such a way that no cash flow ever occurred between them. In all but superficial details,12
this would be a pure arbitrage transaction -- buying and selling the exact same thing.
Second, in the capital markets this equivalence would be recognized in that the two
positions would have the same value, They could be exchanged at arm’s length, without
any cleverness between two parties.
With the tax rules as assumed, the exact equivalence of the two positions is upset
when taxes are taken into account, The zero-coupon discount bond delivers a better flow
of taxable income to the holder because the gain is not taxed until maturity. Relative to
the taxation of the duplicating sequence of short-tern bond transactions, the zero-coupon
discount bond is tax-favored to the holder.
If the timing of the inclusions of the holder were identical to the timing of the
deductions of the issuer, the tax advantage to the holder would be matched by a
disadvantage to the issuer. A simple solution to the OID problem might then seem to be
to let the market absorb the tax aspects of transactions.
The problem with this solution is that the extent of the tax advantage to the holder
of the zero-coupon discount bond depends on the holder’s marginal tax rate, and the
extent of its disadvantage to the issuer depends on the issuer’s marginal tax rate. (A tax
exempt entity is fictionally the same as a taxable entity with zero marginal tax rate.) If
the marginal tax rates of holder and issuer were the same, the advantage of the tax-favored
instrument to the holder would be just balanced by its disadvantage to the issuer. In that
case, we would expect the market-detemined terms of the two types of instruments to
correct for their different tax attributes. Through adjustment in the prices of debt
contracts, the implied afier-tax yields would be equated, regardless of the cash-flow13
pattern involved, and regardless of the relationship of the taxation of any one of them,
taken in isolation, to any patiicular income concept.
The possibility of such an adjustment illustrates the point that correctness of the
treatment of a transaction is not required to achieve the result of consistency between the
effective taxation of two types of instruments. In the example, both currently taxed and
original issue discount bonds (taxed by the old rules) could coexist in financial market
equilibrium with no real consequences, If the result for the currently tax bond were
correct, then taxing original interest bonds by the old rules would also give the correct
result, even though the treatment is not correct, viewed in isolation. Notice that this is not
simply another manifestation of the point that inequities tend to be erased through market
reactions, at a cost in the form of inefficiency (Bittker, 1980). In this case, the market
erases incorrectness at no cost, The opportunities faced by the saver or dissaver would be
the same (namely, the after-tax rate of currently taxed interest), regardless of the form of
the chosen instrument. So if the current-taxation of ordinary interest were correct, the
saver or dissaver would be correctly taxed, regardless of the form of the chosen
instrument
The firther point is also illustrated by this case, since, with inflation, the basic rule
of taxing periodic interest does not produce a measure of accruing real wealth:
correctness of the taxation of neither type of instrument is required to eliminate the
opportunities for tax arbitrage profit. (Note, however, that, afier the market has done its
work, with a urzz~ormrate of tm the incorrect rule of taxing nominal interest will produce
the economic effect of taxing real income. This is because the market will build the14
taxation of the “inflation premium” in interest rates into the interest rates themselves,
(See, for example, Bradford, 1986, pp. 229-230.))
By extension of the same line of reasoning, debt involving any arbitrq cash flow,
with arbitrary rules about the timing of inclusion of interest received and deduction of
interest paid, could coexist with debt paying periodic interest and taxed according to the
usual rules provided the same marginal rate of tax applied to all payers and recipients and
inclusion and deduction were simultaneous. I develop this point at greater length below
where I look, in particular, at the possibility that such market adjustment would also deal
with the cases of contingent return that are the subject of Warren’s analysis.
If it is taken for granted that a single-rate system is not a realistic possibility, this
analysis will serve simply to highlight the much more serious challenge of designing
satisfactory rules for a multiple-rate world, The existence of taxpayers in different
marginal rate brackets virtually eliminates the potential to use market adjustment as a
substitute for consistent rules to measure returns over time. Something like the yield-to-
maturity approach will work for risk-free instruments, but, as Warren’s analysis makes
clear, that approach will not generalize to cover all the problem cases,
Warren’s Analysis
In his essay, Warren developed two general propositions:
l The present income taxis based on transactions and accords very different
treatment to two classes of transaction: those that are held to depend for their
resolution on contingencies to be determined in the fiture (“wait and see
transactions”), and those that are held to involve fixed and determinate terms at
the outset (taxed on some sort of yield-to-maturity basis).15
l This distinction is not tenable in theory or, increasingly, in practice.
The put-call parity theorem of finance theory provides the key to understanding
these propositions. That theorem builds on the fact that buying and holding a share of
stock (with market value S) plus a put on that share with a particular strike price and date
(valued in the market at P), while writing a call on that share with the same strike price
and date (valued at C), produces exactly the same cash flow pattern as results from
holding a zero-coupon bond over the period until the strike date, That being the case, the
two positions must have the same value in the market. Letting T(“Treasury”) stand for
the discount bond’s value, the theorem says:
S+P-C= T.
The theorem derives from the fact that the cash-flow consequences of holding the
portfolio reflected in the left-hand side are identical under every contingency to holding
the Treasu~ bond reflected in the right-hand side. (I neglect here possible consequences
of different rights in the governance of the corporation,) The problem is that the tax
treatment of the right-hand side is yield-to-maturity, and of every element of the left-hand
side is wait-and-see. In general, the two ways of determining taxable income lead to
different results. Specifically, under the current standard rules, the Iefi-hand-side package,
the components of which are assumed acquired at the outset of the option period and
disposed of or settled for cash on the strike date, is taxed the way original issue discount
bonds used to be taxed: capital gain on the difference between purchase price and
maturity value (Ferguson, 1994, p. 1003; Warren, 1993, p. 464). The right hand side is
taxed (roughly) on accrual.16
It seems almost inevitable that the taxation of financial instruments will involve a
blend of yield-to-maturity and wait-and-see elements, which I take to be more or less
synonymous with “accrual” and “realization” accounting, Does this inevitably imply the
need for nonlinear anti-abuse rules that render the tax system complex and introduce
unwanted incentive effects (for example, by disallowing true economic loss deductions)?
This is the question to which I now turn.
III. Time and Marginal Tax Rates
The World of a Single Marginal Tax Rate
To develop the analysis I proceed in steps, first looking at the world of certainty,
where only time matters. In that world, I first take up the case where all participants in
the market cofiont the same rate of tax. This is the context in which it is most likely that
adjustments in the market prices of financial instruments can neutralize potential tax
arbitrage profit opportunities,
Svmmetw is Sufficient
For purposes of the rest of this paper I attach particular meanings to the terms
“symmetty” and “consistency” as applied to the tax system’s treatment of financial
instruments. By symmetry I mean the sort of “equal and opposite” treatment of the party
and counterpart to a financial instrument that obtains for debt. Shuldiner (1992) uses this
term to describe the tax consequences of a transaction if there is “equivalent” treatment of
the two sides. I mean hereby equivalent treatment that, whenever a transaction has as a
consequence a deduction from taxable income for one of the parties to a financial
instrument it also has as a consequence an equal and simultaneous inclusion in the taxable17
income of the counterpart, Symmetry involves a party and counterpart. As I use the
term henceforth, the concept of consistency supplements symmetry with additional
requirements on the tax results from different sets of transactions of a single party. I give
more details on this notion of consistency as needed below.
When there is just a single marginal tax rate applicable to all transactors, and the
tax treatment applicable to the instrument in question is symmetrical in the sense just
defined, then tax effects can be capitalized into market prices of financial instruments. To
develop this point, it will be sufficient to consider in detail a two-period world, identified
by three time points, O, 1, and 2, that we can think of as one year apart.
The basic building blocks are simple one-period (“unit”) interest-bearing bonds. A
time Ounit bond sells for 1 at time Oand pays off l+rol at time 1. A time 1 unit bond sells
for 1 at time 1 and pays off l+rlz at time 2.
Table 1 lays out in general form the cash flows associated with the two possible
unit bonds as well as with an arbitrary alternative instrument; c1 and CZrepresent the
payoffs from investing z in the alternative instrument at time O. For reference, Table 1 also
shows the cash flows associated with borrowing in the form of a zero-coupon (discount)
bond that will pay 1 at time point 2 and nothing at time point 1. Its price at time Ois
denoted Z02,reflecting the fact that it is issued at time Oand will pay off at time 2, two
periods later.18
Table 1. Cash Flows to Lender Using Various Instruments
Time Point: o 1 2
Time OUnit Bond -1 1+ rOl
Time 1 Unit Bond -1 1+ rlz
Alternative Instrument -z c1 C2
Discount Bond -Z02 1
The two unit bonds filly determine the relative prices of dollars in the three
periods, In the absence of taxes, the price of any arbitrary cash flow sequence is
determined by eliminating the opportunity for arbitrage profit, This is because any
sequence can be reproduced exactly by an appropriate package of purchases and sales of
unit bonds, To match the future payoff from the alternative instrument in Table 1, invest
c1 C2
(l+ro, )+(l+ro, )(l+rl, )
in the time Ounit bond at time O, At time 1 the payoff will be
C2
“+(l+r12)
Extract c1 and purchase C2
(1+ r,, )
units of the time 1 unit bond. At time 2 the payoff will
be C2,
From this description, it seems apparent that the price of the alternative instrument
must be given by ( 1 ), At the risk of being tedious, I would emphasize that the underlying
mechanism assuring this result is arbitrage. That is, if the going price, z, of the alternative
instrument differs from the sum needed to be invested at time Oto reproduce its fiture
cash flows, there will be arbitrage profit to be made, The profit would take the form of a
positive cash flow in some period with no offsetting negative cash flow in any period. As19
the description suggests, such a pure surplus could be had by an appropriate sequence of
borrowing (selling) and lending (buying) transactions in the unit bonds, coupled with
either buying or selling (depending on the direction of the inequality) the alternative
instrument.
(1) c1 C2 z=
(l+rol)+ (l+ro1)(l+r12)
When we introduce taxes on unit bonds, the price of the alternative instrument will
depend upon the taxable income flows associated with holding it. Table 2 lays out
schematically the taxable income associated with the unit bonds as well as an arbitrary
sequence of taxable income flows (denoted ti) that might, hypothetically, be attached to
the alternative instrument specified in Table 1. Also shown is the taxable income flow for
the zero-coupon bond under the old rules: no tax until realization
point taxable income is the difference between basis and payoff.
at time 2, at which
Table 2. Taxable Income Flows from Borrower to Lender with Symmetry
Time Point: o 1 2
Time OUnit Bond ro1
Time 1 Unit Bond r12
Alternative Instrument to tl tz
Discount Bond 1-Z0220
Readers will be very familiar with the idea that afier-tax cash flows are discounted
at the after-tax discount rate by taxable investors. This is the essence of the story spelled
out in Table 3. In the expressions in the table, the symbol ml stands for the marginal tax
rate of the lender, and mb for the marginal tax rate of the borrower. The first row of
Table 3 shows the condition on the price, z 1,of the alternative financial instrument
specified in Table 1 at which a lender (the demander of the instrument) would find it an
interesting proposition when the applicable tax consequences are as shown in Table 2.
The second row of Table 3 shows the condition on the price, z b, of the alternative
financial instrument at which a borrower (the supplier of the instrument) would find it an
interesting proposition.
A low price for the instrument means a high yield, The equality case of the
condition in both rows shows the point of indifference between putting money into the
instrument and, instead, putting money into some combination of unit bond purchases and
sales. For the lender who is buying the instrument any price is attractive that is below a
critical break-even level that depends on the lender’s marginal tax rate. For the borrower,
who is selling the instrument, the inequality runs in the other direction. An attractive price
is one that is higher than a break-even level that depends on the borrower’s marginal tax
rate. Again, the conditions in Table 3 are based on arbitrage considerations. Thus, for
Table 3. Demand (Lender) and Supply (Borrower) Prices for a Financial Instrument
Price at which lender would c1– mfil C2– m\t’2




Price at which borrower c1 – m~t, c2 – m~t2
would be willing to sell the
zb > –mhtO +
(l+(l-m, )r,, )+(1+(1 -m, )r,, )(l+(l-m,)r,,)
instrument21
example, if the price is strictly greater than the right hand side value in the second row,
there is an arbitrage profit to be made by taxpayer with marginal tax rate mb, by borrowing
in the form of selling the instrument for a relatively high price, using the proceeds to lend
in the unit bond market, to finance the fiture payoff on the alternative instrument (taking
into account the associated tax consequences).
If m is the single applicable marginal tax rate, there will be exactly one value of the
instrument satis&ing both conditions specified in Table 3, The opportunity for arbitrage
profit for both borrowers and lenders is eliminated simultaneously by the price given in
expression ( 2 ), which corresponds to ( 1 ) with taxes taken into account.
(2) c1– mtl C2– mt2
z = ‘into+ (l+(l-m)rol) + (l+(l-m)rol)(l+ (l-m)rlz)
The fact that there is a single tax rate implies that the discount factors (the factors
multiplying the cash flows) on the right hand side of ( 2 ) are the same for everyone, and
the fact of symmetry in the taxable income flows means that the amount added to or
subtracted from the afier-tax cash flows as a result of the tax is the same for everyone.
Any positive amount of tax that has to be paid by the lender will be reflected in a lower
price that the lender would be willing to pay for the instrument, that is, a lower amount
that can be realized by the borrower, who is exactly compensated by the corresponding
deductions.
What If Demand and Su~~lV Prices Differ?
With different marginal tax rates, the critical values of the demand and supply
prices, the prices that would render demanders and suppliers indifferent between the
alternative instrument and the package of unit bonds that reproduces the fiture cash flows,22
will generally differ. There are two possibilities: First, the maximum price the lender
would be willing to pay for the instrument could be below the minimum price the
borrower would be willing to accept. In this case, the transaction in question would not
be observed. The same effective transaction would be carried out using unit bonds.
The second possibility is that the maximum price the lender would be willing to
pay for the instrument exceeds the minimum price the borrower would accept. Here we
would say that capital market equilibrium does not exist in the model world. Translated
into application, it means that there would be no natural limit on the tax arbitrage profit to
be made at a price somewhere between the two limits. The lender would sell the time O
unit bonds to buy the alternative instrument and the borrower would buy time Ounit bonds
with the proceeds of selling the alternative instrument.
These two possibilities are not independent. If there is a transaction that would
not take place between a borrower in one tax bracket and a lender in the other (because it
is unattractive to both sides), the reverse transaction will provide an opportunity for tax
arbitrage profit.23
Price adjustments cannot eliminate this profit potential. Either the marginal tax
rates must be equated, or linearity of the tax rules must be sacrificed (for example,
incorporating limits on the allowable loss that can be claimed by a taxpayer),T
As the algebra suggests, if there is any potential for arbitrage profit, the absolute
amount of profit is proportional to the scale of the transactions. Since the pure arbitrage
transaction involves no actual cash changing hands (except with the tax collector) there is
no natural limit. As a practical matter, however, the transactions are not costless, so the
quantitative importance of the potential for arbitrage profit depends sensitively upon the
degree of difference in marginal tax rates and on the interest rate.
The Case of a Zero-Coupon Bond
The taxation of cash-basis issuers and holders of a zero-coupon bond under the old
rules provides a convenient illustration of these ideas. Under this rule for taxable income,
the market-clearing price of the zero-coupon bond implied by ( 2 ) is ( 3 )
(3) l-m(l–zo2)
z–
02-(1+(1 - m)ro,)(1+(1 -m)r,’)
Some algebra translates condition ( 3 ) into ( 4), which should have a ftiliar
look. The discount factor on the right hand side is modified from the no-tax case by terms
7 In a graduated rate system, the marginal tax rate can adjust endogenously. So, for
example, if high bracket taxpayers could deduct interest on borrowing to hold tax exempts
and low bracket taxpayers could costlessly go short tax exempts, tax arbitrage would lead
everyone to end up in the same marginal rate bracket, Someone whose marginal tax rate
was below this common level would lend on a taxable basis and borrow tax exempt by
going short. The result would bean arbitrage gai~ a higher taxable income, and a higher
marginal tax rate. The opportunity for arbitrage profit would persist until marginal tax
rates were all equal, Note that a limit on allowable loss deductions can also be viewed as
making the marginal tax rate endogenous, since a taxpayer up against the limit faces a24
that incorporate the advantage to the lender of the deferral of tax, from time 1 to time 2,
on the implicit yield between time Oand time 1. If the marginal tax rate is zero, the right
hand side reduces, as expected, to the no-tax expression. A positive marginal tax rate
raises the equilibrium price of the instrument, the amount the lender would be willing to
give and the borrower require to be paid for the fiture cash and taxable income flows. (It
is not clear from the derivation, but is the case, that the tax rate in question in this example




Under General Conditions. Symmetry is Necessary
As has been demonstrated, with a single tax rate, symmetry of the rule determining
the income of party and counterpart of a financial instrument is wfficient for any
disparity from the treatment of the unit bonds to be completely absorbed in the price of the
instrument. There is no need to provide special rules to limit tax arbitrage profit. mote
that this statement requires that there really be just one rate. This condition would be
violated by, for example, the presence of tax exempt participants in a market where
taxable persons or entities all have some positive marginal rate.)
A natural question is whether symmetry is also necessary. That is, would a rule
that violated symmetry necessarily result in an unlimited opportunity for tax arbitrage
profit? The answer is yes if we confine our attention to the case in which the sum of the
deductions from taxable income by one party over the life of the instrument equals the sum
marginal tax rate of zero on firther losses of the type subject to the limit. For firther25
of inclusions in taxable income by the counterpart. (Two additional conditions are taken
for granted: interest rates and the single marginal tax rate are positive.)
Here is the argument. Suppose the tax rules do not have the symmetry property
with respect to some particular position. For example, let the offending case involve a
deduction for the “borrower” side of the position (I use the term just to identi~ one of the
counterparties), that occurs before the inclusion in the income of the lender. This would
describe the old treatment of the discount bond issued by an accrual taxpayer to a cash
taxpayer in the same rate bracket. To be concrete, suppose that the borrower in a unit
position of this financial instrument gets to deduct $100 at some point, but that the lender
does not have to include the $100 until two years later. Now suppose a person takes both
sides of this financial instrument, being both borrower and lender. Then there is no net
cash flow involved apart from taxes. But by virtue of being the borrower, the taxpayer
gets a deduction of $100 at some point, which is offset by an inclusion of the same
amount, two years later. If there is a positive after-tax interest rate, this change in the
timing of tax liabilities is valuable. By firther transactions in the unit bonds, the taxpayer
could arrange for a cash flow sequence that is positive at some time point and never
negative,
There is no way to eliminate this tax advantage through adjustment in the price at
which the position is exchanged, since it results from holding simultaneously opposite
sides of the same instrument.
development of the role of endogenous adjustment in marginal rates, see Bradford (1980).26
Current Realization Approach to Caoital Gains Taxation Fails the Symmetrv Test
The discussion of the zero-coupon bond, showing that capital markets could
incorporate taxation at maturity on a capital gain basis, assumed that both issuer and
purchaser of the instrument held the instrument to maturity, Barring limits on capital
losses, however, it will generally be advantageous for one side or the other of this
transaction to accelerate the realization of a loss at time 1. The tax treatment of the
position held to maturity, while formally correct, is therefore of limited relevance. The
question is, whether the tax that results from optimized realization behavior can be
incorporated into the market price (always given a single applicable marginal tax rate)
Table 4. Cash and Taxable Income Flows to Borrower
(Taxpayer Option to Realize)
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Taxable Income










Examination of the sequence of transactions in Table 4 establishes that the taxable
income flows that result when taxpayers advantageously time their realizations fail the test
of symmetry. It is possible to establish zero-market value positions that shifi tax liability
toward the fiture. Table 4 lays out the taxable income flow to the borrower under two
scenarios. In the first, the original borrower pays off the loan at maturity, In the second27
the original borrower pays someone else an amount 212,the price of the discount bond as
of time 1, to take over the obligation. There is no net cash flow in the aggregate to the
borrower’s side at time 1, since the original borrower’s outflow is matched by the i~ow
of the person taking over the obligation. But there is an increase in the original
borrower’s liabilities for tax purposes amounting to zIZ-ZOZ, which can be claimed as a
deduction. The remaining unrealized loss to the borrower side of the financial instrument
appears as the deduction, 1-212,at time 2. If the lender waits to realize gain until maturity,
the taxable income flows are asymmetric, and the net effect, in the aggregate, is to
accelerate the deduction side, relative to the inclusion side. Table 5 and Table 6 spell out
the details.
Table 5 describes an arbitrage sequence in that the transactions are organized to
produce a net cash flow of zero at every time point except time 1. The “bottom line” in
Table 5. Details of Discount Bond Issuer’s Tax Arbitrage Transactions
Time Point; o 1
Transaction: Issue l/z02 discount Receive principal plus interest on the
bonds for $1, unit bond.
Buy unit bond, Pay someone to take over the
discount bonds, realizing a loss.
I I Pay any taxes due.
Details of transactions: I I
Time OUnit Bond I -1 I l+ro,
Discount Bond 1 I –1/202









the table shows just such a sequence, There is an arbitrage profit if the one non-zero
result, shown in the lower right hand cell of the table, is positive. To bring about the
required pattern, the issuer of I/zOzunits of the discount bond uses the $1 proceeds to buy
a time Ounit bond. The third column of Table 5 shows the cash flow at time 1, when the
discount bond issuer unwinds the pair of positions. The time Obond pays off (l+rol), The
discount bond is equivalent to a quantity of time 1 unit bonds, since there is no tax
advantage to the holder looklng ahead from that point. So the l/zoz units must be worth
the payoff amount at time 2, l/zo2, discounted at the time 1 unit bond rate, rlz. The issuer
of the discount bond will thus have to pay someone that amount to take over the
1/202 instrument, giving rise to the cash outflow — There are, in addition, cash flows
l+rlz
owing to the tax consequences of all this: –mrol (an outflow) due to the interest received,
1/202 and m(— – 1) (an inflow) due to the fact that the amount paid to buy out of the
l+rlz
discount bond obligation exceeds the amount received on its issue. The net proceeds are
shown in the lower right-hand cell of Table 5; the no profit condition for the issuer,
expressed algebraically by ( 5 ), is that this amount be less than or equal to zero.
(5)
Condition ( 5 ) simplifies to ( 6 ).
(6)







Table 6 depicts the other side of the market, showing the result of financing the
holding to maturity of $1 worth of the discount bond by a sequence of borrowings in the29
form of unit bonds, Note that there is a fourth column, showing the cash flows at time 2.
The transactions are designed to produce a net cash flow of Oexcept at time 2. The lower
right-hand cell of Table 6 contains the net result at time 2, from which we see that the no
profit condition for the person who lends in the form of a discount bond (the buyer of the
instrument) is given by ( 7 ),
(7) -(1 +(1 - m)r~~)(l + r~~)+ ~ - m((: - 1)- r~~(l + (1 - m)r~~)) s o
Z02
which simplifies to ( 8 ).
(8)
Taking ( 6 ) and ( 8 ) together, if the marginal tax rate and the first period interest
rate are positive, i.e., m >0 and rol >0, then the critical price, b, for the lender is greater
than the critical price, a, for the borrower. A price for the discount bond that
simultaneously eliminates opportunities for arbitrage profit by borrower and lender thus
must satisfi the condition that it is less than itsel~ Z02< Z02.This is impossible; no such
price exists.30
Table 6. Discount Bond Lender’s Tax &bitrage Transactions
(Taxpayer Option to Realize)
Time Point: o 1 2
Transaction: Buy 1/202 Pay principal plus Collect 1/202on the discount
discount interest on the unit bonds,
bonds for bond,
$1.
Pay principal plus interest on the
Collect tax savings time 1 unit bonds.
Sell time O from interest Pay any taxes due.
unit bond deducted.
(borrow). Sell time 1 unit
bonds to cover the
difference.
Details of cash flows:
Time OUnit Bond 1 -(l+ro~
Time 1 Unit Bond (l+(l-m)rO~ -(1+(1 -m)rOJ(l+r,J
Discount Bond -1 l/zo2
Tax o mrol 1
–m((— – 1)–r12(l +(1 –m)rol)
202
Net o 0
-(1 +(1 -m)ro, )(l +rl, ) +$-
1
m((— – l)–r,z(l +(l-m)ro, ))
202
Possible Fixes for Capital Gains
The stark conclusion is that, even if there is just one marginal tax rate, some
nonlinearity (such as the ceiling on the deductibility of losses) is required to limit tax
arbitrage profit when income is based on the present realization conventions, Note that
this particular conclusion has nothing to do with “cherry picking” or other risk-related
phenomena, but rather turns on timing alone: The party and counterpart can choose31
different realization paths, to their mutual advantage, Some other approach, satisfying the
symmetry requirement, would be required, of which the following four are examples.
Mark to Market
Under a mark-to-market rule, the holder of an instrument would recognize gain or
loss each period by including in income the difference in the instrument’s market value and
its basis at the end of the period, Recognized gain would be added to basis (and loss
deducted from basis). Cash payments received during the period would be subtracted
from basis. If the issuer of such an instrument were treated in the same way, except that
cash payments paid during the year were added to basis, any time holding one side of the
position resulted in a loss, holding the other side would result in a gain of the same
amount, thereby satisfing the symmetry property.
I~ore Intermediate Transactions
Another approach would be to provide that a sale of an instrument such as the
illustrative zero-coupon bond would have no tax consequences, Basis would go along
with the instrument. The purchaser of the instrument at time 1 would thus obtain with the
fiture cash flow the fiture taxable income flow that would otherwise have gone to the
initial holder. In this way, the symmetry of the tax treatment would be assured.
As a result, the market could incorporate any apparent rnismeasurement of income
into the prices of financial instruments, provided that everyone in the market faced the
same tax rate. The fiture tax consequences for the ultimate holder of the instrument at
maturity would be discounted into the price obtained at intermediate points. In our
example, it is readily shown that the market-clearing price at issue in this case WOUldbe
given by(4), and the price at time 1 by ( 9 ).32
(9)
Impute Interest Current&
Another possibility would be to impute interest to the holder of a financial
instrument, providing as well an addition to basis.g (The issuer would obtain an imputed
deduction and corresponding basis adjustment.) Cash payment from borrower to lender,
whether representing “interest” or “principal,” would give rise to a deduction from basis of
the lender and a corresponding adjustment for the borrower. It can be shown that under
these rules the price a taxpayer would be willing to pay for the discount bond would be the
same as in the no-tax world. This implies that the price would be independent of the
applicable tax rate (by contrast with the previous example).
This is very close to the present treatment of a discount bond. Present treatment
involves calculating a yield to maturity and imputing annual interest income to the lender
(and allowing a deduction to the borrower) of the product of that rate and the adjusted
basis of the instrument, which is increased by the amount of the imputed interest, The
main difference from the suggested alternative is that the adjustment required to eliminate
the potential for arbitrage profit from selective timing of capital gain and loss on the
instrument is the current period’s market rate, not a yield to maturity.
The yield to maturity of a financial instrument is that unz~ormrate of period-by-
period interest that equates the market value of the instrument to the discounted value of
its fiture cash flows, If the actual, known, fiture period-by-period interest rates vary in
g This is the approach suggested by Cunningham and Schenk (1992).33
the risk-free context assumed in this section, then the yield-to-maturity of an instrument
with any arbitrary cash-flow profile will be a kind of average of them. If, on the other
hand, the actual, known, fiture period-by-period interest rates are the same, then the yield
to maturity of an instrument will equal that common value. It is only in this case that the
present yield-to-maturity method of assigning interest income and deductions forecloses
profit from tax arbitrage using unit bonds. When there is variation in the one-period
interest rate, the yield-to-maturity approach to imputation results in a difference between
an instrument’s basis and its market value, opening up the possibility for tax arbitrage
profit. 9 (There is an additional element involved in the term structure of interest rates in
practice: fiture unit bond rates are not known, so that the price of a fiture dollar
incorporates a bet on fiture interest rates, as well as purely intertemporal value. I develop
this point below.)
In the world of petiect certainty, imputation of interest should result in exact
equality between the market value of an instrument and its adjusted basis. This precise
equality would fail, in general, under the yield-to-maturity approach, As a practical
matter, however, by narrowing the difference between basis and market value, the yield-
to-maturity imputation presumably greatly narrows the potential for profit, that is,
increases the likelihood that transactions costs would swamp the gain, even if limitation on
the deductibility of capital losses did not address the problem in another way.
9 See Bankman and Klein (1989), Sims (1992),34
Impute Interest on Realization
Another possibility would be to impute interest on realization. That is, at the time
the instrument is sold, the taxable income would be based, in effect, on the assumption
that the proceeds of the sale were the result of a sequence of investments in unit bonds (at
each intermediate point reinvesting the proceeds from the previous point’s investment)
from the time of acquisition to the sale date, The period-by-period interest payments thus
imputed to the instrument at the time of sale would be allocated to the intervening tax
years. Interest would be charged on any taxes that would have been due, with everything
settled up at the time of sale.1° (The tax on an instrument held to maturity would be the
same as that on one sold at that time for the payoff amount, Cash payments received
during the holding period would be treated as sales proceeds on a position held since the
acquisition date of the underlying instrument.)
The only observed facts about the transaction used in this approach are the sale
price of the instrument and its acquisition date. The amount of money that changed hands
at the time of acquisition does not enter the calculation; the concept of basis is not
invoked.
The symmetrical treatment would apply to the issuer of the instrument, who would
obtain, in effect, a deferred interest deduction. Intermediate cash flows would be treated
as realizations, dated from the time of acquisition.
10This is the Auerbach (1991) method.35
Table 71aysout thedetails ofttisapproach inthetwo-period conteti. Notethat
the net-of-tax payoff on the discount bond at time 2 (the lower right-hand cell of Table 7)
simplifies to ( 10 ).
~((1 +~o]) – ~~01)~12 ~~ol(l+~12) = (1+ (1- m)ro, )(1 +(1 - ~)~,z) (lo)
1- (l+~o, )(l+~12) - (1 +~o, )(l +~,2) (1 +~o, )(1 + ~,2)
The market equilibrium price of the instrument is determined by discounting the
afier-tax cash flows at the afier-tax interest rates. As shown in ( 11 ), as in the case of
imputing interest currently to basis (and adjusting basis accordingly), under the suggested
tax rules, the price is independent of the investor’s tax rate, being simply the discounted
(at the before-tax market interest rates) value of before-tax flows.
(11) (1+ (1 -m)ro~)(l + (1 - m)r~~)
(1+ ro~)(l +r~~) 1
’01 = (1+(1 -??z)ro~)(l + (1 - m)r,~) = (1 + ?-o~)(l+r,*)
Although I have not spelled it out in detail, it is the case that this rule results in tax
effects’ being incorporated to asset prices even though it does not satisfy the property of
symmetry (since either party to the instrument has the option to sell at time 1), It might be
thought that this fact contradicts the conclusion that symmetry is necessa~, as well as
sufficient, for tax effects to be filly incorporated to market prices of instruments.
Necessity, however, was shown to obtain for rules that result in equality between the sum
of inclusions in and deductions from income for the party and counterpart to the
instrument, The interest-imputation-on-realization rule may not satis~ this condition, and
would not do so in the case in which one party chose to realize at time 1, whereas the
counterpart realized at time 2. This rule satisfies, instead, the weaker symmetry36
Table 7, Imputing Interest at Maturity to Discount Bond Lender
Time Point:
Transaction:
Valuation Implicit in Tax
Calculation at Time 2
Implicit Interest in Tax
Calculation at Time 2
Implicit Tax on Implicit
Interest in Tax Calculation
at Time 2
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:ondition, that the discounted sum of taxable inclusions equal the discounted sum of
deductions from the tax base, which is sufficient as well as necessary for the result.
Correctness in the Treatment of Time
With symmetry, or with its present value equivalent, and a single rate of tax, tax
arbitrage profit will be eliminated in financial market equilibrium, where the taxation of the
unit bonds -- the taxation of ordinary, one-period interest -- is taken as the fixed element37
of the system. As I have already stressed, this fixed element does not give the correct
measure if by “correct” is meant real (inflation-corrected) income. 11
Getting to a correct measure would require adjusting the nominal interest receipts
and payments to extract the itiation premium. 12 A relatively simple procedure for doing
so would be to generalize the imputation of interest to basis for all assets, including the
ordinary one-period bonds that are the foundation stones of the income measurement
system. Income for the year would be the product of adjusted basis and whatever is
determined to be the inflation-adjusted interest rate. The annual adjustment to basis would
include, in addition to the usual increase for imputed interest and decrease for any cash
received, a percentage increase equal to the change in the price level during the period,
(Basis adjustment for cash flows between the beginning and end points of the year would
require some appropriate approximation for price-level change during the year,)
Given that interest imputation is required for all but the fundamental one-period
instruments in any case, it would thus be conceptually fairly simple to implement an
inflation-corrected tax. If the analysis were extended to take into account, for example,
real investment, inflation correction would be an important consideration (since tax
arbitrage forces come into play in that connection as well).
In the world of a single marginal rate, taxing nominal interest involves an incorrect
income measure, but need not produce an incorrect result. That is because the market
could take into account both the real and nominal elements of the transaction, For
11I have elsewhere (1996) described taxation of nominal interest as giving rise to a
“nominal economic income” tax,
12For discussion and references to the literature, see Bradford (1986).38
example, the nominal interest rate should vary by 1/(1-tax rate) per percentage point of
anticipated, steady itiation, With a 33 percent marginal rate, an interest rate of 3 percent
with no inflation and interest rate of 18 percent with inflation of 10 percent per year would
offer exactly the real same after-tax borrowing and lending terms. (18 percent less 33
percent of 18 percent in tax gives a 12 percent after-tax nominal return. Subtracting the
10 percent inflation, leaves a 2 percent real afier-tax return, the same as in the no-inflation
case,) With multiple tax rates, however, it is impossible for the financial markets to
produce an adjustment that works for all taxpayers. Then incorrect income-measurement
produces “incorrect” real results, as well. 13
Multi~le Tax Rates and the Consistency Requirement
When we leave behind the world of the single tax rate, the constraints on the rules
necessary to permit the elimination of tax arbitrage profit in a linear income measurement
system become more stringent, Symmetry is no longer sufficient. Rather consistency of
income measurement is both suficient and, under conditions, necessary.
Shuldiner defines consistency as the “equivalent treatment by a single taxpayer of
two or more individual transactions making up parts of a larger overall transaction.”
(1992, p. 782) What I have in mind is similar. I specifi consistency as requiring that a
given sequence of net cash flows give rise to the same taxable income flows for all
taxpayers, regardless of how that cash flow is composed out of one or more financial
instruments. Because it is more specific about the meaning of “equivalent treatment” and
13The Comprehensive Income Tax proposal described in the U.S. Treasury’s Blueprints
for Basic Tax Reform erred in relying on financial markets to produce an automatic39
refers to all taxpayers, it is more restrictive than Shuldiner’s concept. As I use the term
here, it is also more restrictive in adding symmetry, which relates to the tax consequences
to the two parties to a financial instrument, Consistency as I use the term here implies
symmetry under my definition, but not vice versa. Assuming that he means to imply the
treatment is universally applicable to all taxpayers, it appears to be close to Stmad’s
usage, at least for the case of cetiainty: “A tax system is consistent if and only if every
cash flow pattern has a unique tax treatment.” (1994, p. 573)
The “old” treatment of the (cash-basis) issuer and holder of an OID bond is an
example of measurement that is symmetrical but not consistent with the treatment of the
equivalent sequence of one-period loans. Yield-to-maturity treatment of an OID bond
gives an example of an effort to achieve consistency. The ideas are (a) that the taxpayer
who has a cash flow from the date of issue of the zero-coupon discount bond to its
maturity should have the same set of inclusions in taxable income, regardless of whether
the cash flow is the result of holding the zero-coupon discount bond or a series of one-
period instruments and (b) whenever one party has an inclusion in income, the
counterpart has a deduction (subject to any limitations that would apply to a borrower
making ordinary periodic interest payments).
The sufficiency of consistency so defined to eliminate the potential for relevant tax
arbitrage profit using financial instruments follows almost by definition, Tax arbitrage is
effected by taking a position in two or more financial instruments so as to produce a zero
net cash flow each period on a before-tax basis, but a valuable flow of taxable income. (In
adjustment of interest income for inflation, an error on which I commented in the Preface40
the usual case, a flow of taxable income is valuable if it has a positive net present value at
afier-tax discount rates; in other words, when it gives rise to an acceleration of deductions
or deferral of taxable income.) If income measurement is consistent, a combination of
instruments that gives rise to a zero net cash flow each period must bring with it the same
sequence of taxable income flows as any other such combination of instruments. But it
cannot be the case that holding no financial instrument (and therefore a zero net cash flow
each period) results in a favorable flow of taxable income.
The more interesting proposition is that consistency is necessary under reasonable
conditions. These conditions are the same ones as applied in the single-rate case: for
rules that imply the sum of inclusions and the sum of deductions on the two sides of a
financial instrument are the same, consistency is necessary if there is always more than one
tax rate in the population of taxpayers and if interest rates are positive.
The argument is very close to the one given above for the necessity of symmetry.
Start with the taxable income flows that are associated with the unit bonds, Refer to as
“the” afier-tax discount rates the implied net of tax rates of return from unit (one-period)
bonds. If the tax rules do not have the consistency property then there must be some
instrument such that the sequence of one-period bond transactions that duplicates its cash
flow produces a different sequence of taxable income flows. Suppose the price of this
other instrument adjusts, along the lines discussed earlier, so as to render the two positions
indifferent for taxpayers with a particular tax rate. (If the price does not so adjust, there is
an opportunity for tax arbitrage profit for those taxpayers, ) Then the discounted sum of
to the 2nd edition (Bradford et al, 1984),41
inclusions in the tax base of the “lender” side of the other instrument, using the after-tax
discount rates, must be the same as the discounted sum of deductions from the tax base of
the “borrower,” using the same after-tax discount rates. At a different tax rate, the after-
tax discount rates will differ, But two different sequences of cash flows that have the
same discounted value at one set of discount rates will have different discounted values at
another set of discount rates, It is impossible to eliminate the potential for arbitrage profit
without giving up the linearity of the tax (or setting all marginal tax rates equal),
OID Rules Illustrate the (Strictly St)eakin~. Unsuccessful) Ouest for Consistency
As discussed above in connection with the analysis of the single-tax rate system,
the present rules for inclusion of interest on an original issue discount bond (impute
interest at the implied yield to maturity) fail the symmetry test when combined with the
option to realize gain or loss. If we restrict our attention to OID bonds held to maturity
by both counterparties, there is symmetry but still, in general, a failure of consistency.
Except when the one-period interest rates are all the same, the sequence of transactions in
unit bonds that reproduces the OID cash flows will generate a different path of taxable
income flows. Whereas this difference in tax results can be built into the price of the
instrument when there is a single tax rate, when there are multiple tax rates, there will
always be an opening for tax arbitrage profit through transactions between a pair of
taxpayers with different marginal rates. 14 (To be sure, the opening maybe very small,
Transactions costs will typically swamp it,)
14See, again, Bankman and Klein (1989), Sims (1992)42
Present Realization AP~roach to Capital Gains Taxation Fails the Consistence Test
Since the present realization regime for capital gains fails the symmetry test, a
fortiori it fails the consistency test, Some of the techniques, discussed in the single-rate
context, that produce symmetric treatment require modification to produce consistency.
Mark to Market
Since mark to market taxation produces exactly the same path of taxable income
as results from the duplicating sequence of unit bond transactions, it satisfies consistency.
Ignore Intermediate Transactions
Ignoring intermediate transactions in an instrument between issue and maturity
(with basis carried over), which guaranteed symmetry, would not generally produce
consistency, This method assures that the path of deductions by the “borrower” side of an
instrument is equal and opposite to the path of inclusions by the “lender” side, regardless
of intervening sales by either side. The problem, however, is that this symmetric result is
not the same as the path of taxable income associated with the duplicating sequence of
unit bond transactions,
Impute Interest Current&
The technique of imputing interest currently would produce consistency, It is
important that the interest imputed be identical to that obtaining on the unit bonds, as this
is how the potential for tax arbitrage is eliminated. This could be effected by taxing the
unit bonds themselves on an imputed-interest basis, in which case the applicable rate could
be chosen as a matter of policy (for example, to equal the inflation-corrected rate).43
Impute Interest on Realization
As we noted, the technique of imputing interest on realization fails the strict
symmetry test, but satisfies an appropriate generalization in the case of a single-rate
system. Roughly the same conclusion applies in the multiple rate system to a modified
specification of this approach, To achieve the effect of consistency, the look-back that
treats the seller of an instrument as having accrued interest at the market rate would have
to apply the seller’s marginal tax rates (both for the implied periodic taxes and for the
effect of any acceleration or deferral of tax payments). Then the discounted value of the
taxable income flows (at the after-tax discount rates applicable for the taxpayer in
question) will be the same as that of the duplicating unit bond transactions. This equality
is the generalization of the consistency notion that is necessary to eliminate the potential
for relevant arbitrage profit with multiple marginal tax rates.
Using, instead, a single marginal tax rate, rather than the seller’s actual marginal
tax rates through time, to infer the factor to apply to the proceeds of sale would fail the
consistency test.
IV. The Taxation of Risky Instruments
Pure Risk Effects: Timeless Gambles
Perhaps because uncertainty is inextricably bound up with sequence (before and
after its resolution), we tend to think of risk and intertemporal return together. Thus, for
example, if I enter into a forward contract to purchase some asset at a specified Price on a
specified date, in the typical situation the price is so chosen that the value of my position
at the outset is zero. Immediately thereafter, however, as information about the fiture
begins to unfold, my position acquires value, Whether the value is positive or negative44
depends upon whether the new information implies the fiture price is more likely to be
higher or lower than anticipated earlier. If the former, my position acquires a positive
value. If the latter, my position acquires a negative value. The value of the position of the
counterpart to my contract moves in exactly the same amount but in the opposite
direction. These effects occur with the passage of time, but time is not of the essence in
the changing values. On the contrary, if all that happens is the passage of time, and no
new information develops, the value of the position will not change at all,
Taxing pure bets between a party and a counterpar&y, involving sequence (before
and after the resolution of uncertainty) but not the passage of time, is less problematical
than the taxation of transactions involving time. The striking fact is that, provided the
same tax rate applies to the gains and losses from a risky position, the tax rate itself is of
no fundamental importance. The reason is simple: the tax has the effect of reducing the
scale of the bet but not the relative payoffs under the various relevant contingencies,
Since transactors have the option of varying the scale of their bets without recourse to the
tax system, taxation does not affect the set of possible bilateral bets at all.
To illustrate, by analogy with the choice between a series of one-period loans and
a zero-coupon discount bond, suppose there were two kinds of bets, taxable and not, with
the choice lefi up to the transactors. For example, suppose gains and losses from flipping
pennies are taxable if the bet is governed by a contract written in red ink, but not if it is
governed by a contract written in green ink. The green ink deals get the wrong result
from the point of view of proper income accounting. But one cannot produce tax
arbitrage profit consequences.45
The analogy to the discount case would involve something like my writing a red
contract betting on heads and a green contract betting on tails for the same coin flip
(thereby eliminating any actual risk), and the counterpart doing the opposite. It is true
that this would convert an apparently riskless situation for me into a genuine gamble,
because I will either pay tax or collect a refind, depending on the coin flip. My
counterpart on the red contract will experience the opposite taxable income outcomes.
But there is no opportunity for arbitrage profit at the expense of the tax system, so long as
the marginal rates of the transactors are taken as given. All that is required is that the
applicable tax rates be specified in advance of entering into the bet.
Allowing the parties to specifi the fraction of gains (and losses) to be included in
(deducted from) taxable income would not enable them to obtain an arbitrage profit at the
expense of the tax system. This result holds even if the inclusion fraction is allowed to
differ for the party and counterpart. The essential requirement is that the treatment of
gains and losses for a given party be the same and specified before the uncertainty is
resolved. (Clearly, if I can decide afier the fact whether my position is governed by a red
or green contract, I can profit at the expense of the tax system,)
The tax arbitrage at the heart of the analysis in this paper is thus a matter of time,
and not risk, The question is what this insight implies for the taxation of complex financial
instruments,
Putting Time and Risk Together
Most financial instruments have both intertemporal and risk aspects. An option is
a good example. So too, however, is a long-term bond. Even if there is no risk of default,46
there is a risk of changes in the short-term rates of interest. Thus the value of a long-term
bond between issue date and maturity is risky. 15
Table 8. Illustrative Risky Instruments: Cash Flows to Lender
Time Point: o 1 2
Contingency: Heads Tails
Time OUnit Bond -1 1+ rO1
Time 1 Unit Bond -1 ]+ r12 1+ rlz
Risky Instrument H –z: 1 0
Risky Instrument T –z: o 1
We can use the two-period framework to consider the possibilities. Table 8
illustrates a pair of typical risky instruments, absent taxes. One of the instruments pays the
time 2 if a coin comes up heads. The other instrument pays the holder $1 at
coin comes up tails. The prices of the instruments, determined in the market,
z: and z;, respectively, where the subscript indicates the time point at
holder $1 at
time 2 if the
are denoted
which the value is determined.
It is instructive to consider the effect of variations in the time point at which the
uncertainty is resolved. One possibility is that the uncertainty is resolved (the coin is
flipped) immediately afier the instrument is created and sold, at time O. In that case, the
positive payoffs of the two primitive bets offered in the financial market are, in effect, OID
bonds at time O. (The instrument is worthless if the coin comes up on the wrong side.)
15 The modern theow of the term st~cture of interest rates treats all but the inStantaneOUS
current interest rate as stochastic, with a risk premium typically built into the expected
return on longer-term instruments, See Cox, Ingersoll and Ross (1985).47
The price of an instrument, say the heads bet, will jump immediately from z; to either
zero or 1/(1 + rO1 )(1+ rlz), depending on the outcome. In either case, the price of the
instrument will subsequently appreciate at the risk-free unit bond interest rates until time
point 2,
A second possibility is that the uncertainty is resolved at time point 1, Just before
that moment, each instrument will be identical to what it was at time point O,except that
the payoff moment will have come closer. Its value at that
initial value times 1 plus the time Ounit bond interest rate,
moment will simply be its
Just tier that moment, it will
be known which payoff will occur, It is converted into either zero or a one-period unit
discount bond.
The third possibility is that the uncertainty is resolved at time point 2. Just before
that point, each instrument will be indistinguishable from its issue date except that the time
of payoff will have arrived, The value of the heads claim, for example, will be
Z: (1 + ro,)(1 + r,2). Upon resolution of the uncertainty, its value will jump to 1 or O.
Tax Rules to Prevent Unlimited Tax Arbitrage Profit
The possible time paths of the value of the alternative instrument under different
scenarios about the timing of the resolution of uncertainty suggest what is required to
preclude tax arbitrage profit, To test for the possibility of arbitrage profit, the required
step is to hedge away the risk (as in the case of the Put-Call Parity Theorem) and
determine whether a proposed treatment
resulting pure intertemporal transaction.
risky instruments,
will eliminate the tax arbitrage potential from the
Here risk is eliminated by buying one each of the48
One overarching proposition follows immediately from the analysis of the risk-free
case:
Barring appropriate adjustments to basis, if the rules are linear, taxpayer option to
choose the time to recognize gain or loss will imply the potential for unlimited tax
arbitrage profit. We do not need risk to establish this conclusion, although the presence of
risk renders difficult fixes based on the market value of the instrument.
The various approaches to deal with the problem of gain recognition maybe
divided, as in the risk-free analysis, into the single and multiple tax rate regimes.
One Marginal Tm Rate for All Transactors
Mark-to-Market
Mark-to-market income measurement precludes tax arbitrage profit.
Ignore Intermediate Transactions
Carrying basis along until maturity of the original instrument should work as well
in the presence of risk as in the certainty case. The price of the instrument will reflect the
tax advantage of deferral to the lender and its disadvantage to the borrower.
To illustrate, suppose that in the case displayed in Table 8 a lender purchases a unit
of risky instrument H and that the contingency is resolved, with “Tails” as the outcome
revealed, immediately after purchase but still at time O. The lender’s basis is z~. After
the outcome is revealed, the instrument is worth O. If the lender holds the instrument to
maturity, the payoff after tax will be O– m(O – Z( ) = mz~, By the same argument used
in the risk-free analysis, this payoff will be worth
/( mz~ 1+(1 –m)rO1)(l+(l –m)r12)49
in the market at time O,afier the resolution of the uncertainty. If, alternatively, the lender
sells the asset at time O,this will be the amount realized because the basis in the asset will
be conveyed to the purchaser and deducted at the maturity of the instrument, Since the
net present value (at afier-tax discount rates) of the two outcomes is the same, there is no
payoff (or penalty) to early realization of losses,
Impute Interest Currently
In applying the technique of imputing interest to the holder of an original issue
discount bond in the world of certainty, the payment by the borrower to the lender at
maturity gives rise to a reduction in both borrower’s and lender’s basis to zero, thereby
bringing the imputation to an end. These payments are not otherwise reflected in taxable
income. There is no current deduction of the payment by the borrower, nor inclusion of
amounts received by the lender,
In the world of risk, there is, in addition, settlement of a bet involved in the
payments from borrower to lender, Under the usual treatment of bets, the payment from
loser to winner is currently deducted by the loser and included by the winner. The
question is how one can separate the two (other than by marking to market).
A possible answer is to wait until maturity, along the way imputing, and taxing,
interest on basis (with basis adjustment). At settlement time, any amount paid by the
borrower in excess of adjusted basis would be deducted by the borrower and included by
the lender. Any shortfall of the settlement amount from basis would be deducted by the
lender (as a loss) and included by the borrower.50
This relatively straightforward approach would work out well in a world in which
the instrument is held to maturity. As in the risk-free analysis, the effect is to eliminate the
tax rate from the determination of the value before maturity.
There are two problems presented by sale of the instrument at an intermediate
point. One is the potential for shifting gains to low marginal-rate holders and losses to
high-marginal rate holders. This does not arise in the one-rate case. The second problem
is the potential for cherry picking, which arises because the information about winners and
losers generally emerges before the payoff date.
To illustrate, consider the first scenario described above, in which the coin flip
takes place at time O. For specificity, let us focus on instrument H. The outcome of the
coin flip is to convert it into one of two risk-free discount bonds, one paying off $1 at time
2, and one paying off O. Immediately following the issue of the instrument, the coin is
flipped and there is a jump in its market value, up or down, horn the issue price, z;, to
whatever the value of those discount bonds may be when account is taken of the tax
consequences to the seller and buyer.
In what might be regarded as the natural procedure, the OID bonds would be
taxed to a subsequent acquirer like any other bond with the same terms, and the seller of
the instrument would take into income the proceeds of sale, deducting basis (and thereby
reducing to zero the amount on which interest is imputed to the original lender). Since the
bond-equivalent will be treated by the new “lender” exactly like a newly issued bond, its
market value will have to be either 1/(1+ rO1 )(1 + rlz) or O,depending upon the resolution
of uncertainty at time O, Interest imputation based on the issue price, z;, would tontine
to be deducted by the borrower (with adjustments to basis). Interest imputed to the new51
lender would be higher or lower, depending on the payoff. At maturity, the payments of 1
or O, as appropriate, would be made. For the new lender, the payoff will just equal
adjusted basis, so there will be no tax consequences at payoff time (other than elimination
of basis and its associated interest imputation). For the borrower the payoff amount will
exceed basis in the high-payoff case, resulting in a deduction, In the low-payoff case the
payoff amount will be O,below basis, resulting in a taxable gain,
The question is, would selling the instrument after the uncertainty is resolved
produce a tax advantage? Would it pay, for example, to sell a losing position, thereby
accelerating the deduction of basis? We can pose the issue in general terms by supposing
that the outcome after resolution of uncertainty at time Ois some arbitra~ amount,
~(1 + ~01)(1 + ~z), payable with certainty at time 2. Immediate sale (for a by the original
lender would give the seller a net pay off (1– m)a + mz~, afier taking acount deduction of
basis. Holding to maturity would imply a larger basis deduction at that time, worth
m~(l + rO1)(l+ qz), but at the price of paying tax on imputed interest in the interim,
amounting to mz~r o o] at time 1 and mz~(l + ro,)q2 at time 2. The extra basis deduction
exactly compensates for the extra tax along the way, but the gross sale proceeds grow to
~(1 + rol)(1+ q2), that is, on before-tax terms, resulting in a payoff to deferral whenever a
is positive.
An alternative treatment would be to require carryover of basis until maturity,
much as under the “ignore intermediate transactions” approach, but with the addition of
interest imputation to basis. The purchaser would be obliged to carry the basis, with its
imputed interest, and would take the consequences at maturity of the gain or loss in52
settlement with the issuer. In other words, the purchaser would step into the shoes of the
original lender. The firther new twist is that any excess of the amount paid by an acquirer
over the basis taken over would be treated as settlement of a bet, deducted by the acquirer
and included by the seller, Because the tax rate is the same for all participants, the result
is that the net flow of taxes associated with the instruments in the market would be
independent of intermediate transactions in those instruments. The outcome would be the
same as under obligatory holding to maturity.
Unlike the case of imputation of interest under certainty, which resulted in the
market prices of all instruments being independent of the tax rate, under this generalization
of the approach to the case of risk, “the” tax rate would manifest itself in the market prices
of assets for which gain or loss has been determined.
Impute Interest on Realization
Imputing interest on realization should also work as well in the risky as in the risk-
fiee setting. This is the essence of the Auerbach analysis. 16 Recall that basis is dispensed
with in this approach. Instead, the actual payoff is treated as having been accumulated at
the risk free rate from the acquisition date to the realization point. Typically, the result
would be a lower tax than under a mark-to-market regime on the holder of the winning
risky instrument (who is not taxed on the gain, but simply on the implied past interest),
offset by higher taxes on the loser. This becomes clear when it is noted that, for an
instrument with any positive value, no matter how far below basis, the loser would owe
16For details of the argument, see Auerbach (1991)
tax on realization.53
me Multiple Ta Rate World
In the multiple tax rate world without risk, we saw that a stronger condition than
symmetry, namely consistency, was generally required to preclude tax arbitrage profit.
The general conclusion is that those techniques for dealing with the realization problem for
capital gains that give rise to the independence of the market value of an instrument of the
single rate of tax in the one-rate world continue to work out in the multiple tax rate world,
even with risk.
Of the techniques considered thus far, only the mark to market and the Auerbach
method of retrospective allocation of gain pass the test. Ignoring intermediate
transactions and imputing interest currently work only with a uniform tax rate, because
under these methods the tax rate affects equilibrium asset prices. The essential reason the
mark to market and Auerbach methods work is that they eliminate any timing advantage in
the risk-free case and they imply that the same effective rate of tax will apply to gains and
losses due to the resolution of contingency.
V. A General Procedure for Taxing Financial Instruments
The conclusion of the discussion above is that, with zero transactions cost and
multiple marginal rates of tax (and positive interest rates), the only approaches thus far
suggested that would permit a linear tax are the mark-to-market and Auerbach look-back
methods. Of these, only the Auerbach look-back method is based on realization. If it is
true, as is generally accepted, that the mark-to-market approach is practically infeasible,
the implication would be that the Auerbach look-back system is the only practically
feasible approach thus far discovered that will “work.” The question is, is it the only such
approach, period; is it necessary as well as sufficient?54
The answer is no. As argued above, risk presents “no problem” provided the tax
rate that applies is specified in advance of its resolution. The difficulty with cherry picking
is that it allows the parties to a financial instrument, in effect, to decide after the fact what
tax will apply. They choose a high tax rate to apply to losers (deduction) and a low tax
rate to apply to winners (deferral).
A system that will work must (a) result in consistent taxation of pure timing and
(b) establish in advance the tax rate that will apply to any taxpayer’s gain or loss due to
the resolution of contingency, If the parties are to have a choice of when to realize, the
trick is to find a way to make the parties commit to an effective tax rate in advance.
The Case of a Risk-Free Term Structure
To develop rules sufficient to address both problems it will be convenient to start
with the assumption that the fiture short-term interest rates are known with certainty in
advance. Other returns may be risky, but the short-tern interest rate at each date is
predictable with certainty, In that case, the term structure of interest rates (the implicit
rates of return on zero-coupon bonds with different maturities) would filly inform about
the path of fiture short-term rates.
The ProDosed ADDroach When There Is No Cash Flow before Realization
The first step under the proposed approach is to speci~ at the time a taxpayer
takes a position in afinancial instrument (so at the of writing the contract or on acquiring
the instrument by purchase), a gain reference date (GRD) and a gain tax rate (GTR).
(Although I call these “gain” rate and date, it is intended that they apply to losses as well;
“gain” might be negative.) The specification of gain tax rate and gain reference date is
arbitrary, and they need not be the same for the pafiy and countef’p~y to an instrument.55
GRD and GTR could be specified by the tax authorities. They could even be freely
chosen by the taxpayer. In practice one might want to render these foreign ideas more
digestible by restricting the specification in some way. For example, the gain tax rate
might be the investor’s marginal rate in the preceding year; the gain reference date might
be specified as the date of acquisition of the instrument. The key requirement is that the
date and rate be out of the taxpayer’s control before new information about the instrument
comes in. The gain reference date and the gain tax rate are used only for determining that
party’s tax consequences of gains and losses on the instrument.
Up to the GRD, a taxpayer who acquires an instrument will be taxed on interest
imputed to basis (with a basis adjustment for the imputed amount), exactly as discussed
above in the case of the world without risk. A taxpayer with a net liability (the
“borrower”) will obtain a deduction for imputed interest and corresponding basis
adjustment. The new element is that there is, at the GRD, a special one-time adjustment
to the basis for imputing interest, At that point the basis jumps to the value that would
have to have prevailed to grow at the unit bond rates to the actual realization price at the
realization date. Since this amount is not known until realization, this part of the interest
imputation has to be worked out afier the fact, (In the event of realization before the
GRD another procedure has to be used to make sure the interest imputation results are the
same as they would be if the asset had been held to the GRD.)
The gain tax applies as of the GRD to the jump in basis as of the GRD just
described. The sale of the instrument, regardless of when, will give rise to a tax on the
seller of any gains (with a tax rebate in the event of loss) at the GT~ as though all the
gains relative to basis, adjusted for interest imputed without taking into account the56
special, one-time adjustment, had occurred at the GRD and had been realized then. Under
this approach, the extent of gain is determined by the taxpayer decision to realize, the
revealed amount of gain or loss being projected forward or backward to the GRD at the
going interest rates.
The idea of this system is, I think, fairly simple, even if the details seem somewhat
complex, treated as a cookbook recipe. Apparent complexity arises from the steps needed
to arrange the gain tax so that it were as if all the gain occurred at the GRD and to
implement the imputation of interest to basis. Here are rules that will do this:
l In all cases, interest is imputed to basis and subjected to tax until the point of
realization. Basis is adjusted upward by the imputed interest, (For a liability, the
imputation results in a deduction.)
. If the realization is at the GRD, the excess of the realized proceeds over adjusted
basis is subject to tax at the GTR. In the event of a loss, there is a credit of the GTR
times the loss.
. If the realization is after the GRD, there is a look-back calculation. The excess of
realized proceeds over adjusted basis is projected back to the GRD at the before-tax
rate of interest, The gains tax that would have been due at that point is calculated by
applying the GTR to the back-cast amount. The implied tax liability as of the GRD is
brought forward with (deductible) interest and paid at the realization point. In the
event of a loss, there is a credit instead of a positive tax.
Also, the basis to which the interest imputation applies is adjusted retroactively
upward by the amount of the gain as of the GRD. (It is as though the basis had been
marked to market at that point, except that the value used is the back-cast amount,57
rather than the actual market value, which is not observed.) So there is imputed to the
years between the GRD and the realization year interest on the gain, with yearly
compounding, Implied changes in tax for past years are brought forward with
(deductible) interest and paid at the realization point. (In the event of a loss, the extra
interest income is negative; that is, there is imputed to the years between the GRD and
the realization year a deduction of interest on the loss, with yearly compounding.)
. If realization is before the GRD, the gain or loss relative to adjusted basis is projected
to the GRD at the going rates of interest. At the GRD, the gain thus projected is
taxed at the GTR (for a loss there is a credit). 17 Between the realization date and the
GRD, the seller is supposed to continue to get the benefit of deferral (a negative
benefit in the case of a loss). So between the realization date and the GRD the
taxpayer is allowed a deduction of interest imputed to the amount of the gain
(adjusted each year by the amount of interest deduction), (The idea is to offset, until
the GRD, the part of the imputation of interest to basis in a new position taken with
the sales proceeds that is the result of the realization.) In the case of a loss, there is an
annual imputed interest inclusion.
The choice of GRD and GTR together determine the effective rate of tax on gains
and losses, For any given date of realization, the variation in the GRD alters the taxation58
of gains and losses because the rules adjust the basis to which interest is imputed as of the
GRD, Using continuous discounting, and assuming constant marginal tax rate on interest
and a constant interest rate on the continuous equivalent of the unit bonds, the tax payable
at realization date,s, on an extra dollar’s worth of sales proceeds is
1– (1 – GTR)e-m’(S-GRD).Given the realization date,s, an increase in the GRD makes this
effective tax rate on gains smaller. 18 (For further details on the continuous discounting
version of the rules, see the Appendix,)
17 A peculiarity of this procedure is that the tax consequences of realization are not fillY
known until the GRD. This is a consequence of not knowing the taxpayer’s marginal rates
(and perhaps the current interest rates) for the intervening period. If the marginal tax rates
and current interest rates period by period are known in advance, the tax on the gain could
be brought to the realization date, with appropriate discounting. In that case, the basis for
the imputed interest deduction would be reduced by the amount of the gain tax paid at
realization. (The idea of the interest credit is to give the holder the same amount of “tax
fi-ee” accumulation as would obtain if the asset had been held to the G~.)
18In the case of realization at times, an extra dollar realized implies an extra gain tax
liability (reckoned as of the GRD) of GTRe-r(s-Gm), where continuous compounding at
a constant interest rate, r, has been used to simpli@ the calculations. This amount of tax
regarded as payable at the GRD translates into an extra tax at the realization date of
GTRe-r(’-G~) e(l-rn)r(S-G~) = GTRe-mr(S-G~)
,where a constant marginal tax rate,
m, is assumed. There is an additional effect due to the revision in the basis for imputation,
starting at the GRD. (The description applies to a realization after the GRD, but the
mathematical expressions apply as well for a realization before the GRD.) The extra basis
is e-r(s-Gm), implying a flow of extra interest imputed of
~e–r(s–GRD)er(t -GRD) = ~e
‘(t–s) starting at t = GRD and running up to the realization
date,s. This, in turn, implies an extra flow of tax liability, mrer(t-s), which must be
brought forward and paid ats. An extra dollar realized ats thus implies an extra amount




~rer(t–s)e(~–m)r (’–t)dt = s ~rem’(t–s)dt
GRD GRD
= emr(t–s) s ~D=l-e
–mr(s–GRD)59
An Illustration of the Proposed A~~roach
To take an illustration, suppose your tax rate is 30% the going interest rate is 10%
and you have invested $1000 in a share of stock this morning. You have established a
GRD of one year from now, and a GTR of 50V0, By this afternoon, your stock has
jumped to $1200, You know that fi-omhere on, the stock will yield with certainty the
going rate of return on risk-free bonds, with no cash dividends. 19 Consider the choice of
when to sell.
. If you wait one year, your asset will be worth $1320. Your basis will be adjusted up
to $1100, at a cost to you of $30 in tax on the imputed interest. The gain calculated at
that time will be $220, on which you will owe $110, You will be lefi with $1320-$30-
$110=$1180.
. If you wait an extra year to time 2, you will pay tax at the one-year point of $30 on
imputed interest, In order to get everything to one point in time, assume you borrow
the $30. Your position at the end of the second year will then be an asset worth
$1452 and a liability of $33 (bringing with it a $3 interest deduction). The basis of the
asset will be $1210 ($1000 + $100 + $11O)and you will owe tax of 30°/0 of the second
year’s imputed interest of $110.
Putting the two pieces together, the extra tax due at the realization date due to an extra
dollar realized then is GTRe
–mr(s–GRD) + 1 _ e– mrf~-G~) = 1 _ (1 _ GTR)e-mr(s–G~),
19These assumptions are made to allow us to focus on the essential issue of cherry
picking. Alternatively, we could specifi a hedging transaction that would eliminate any
risk of gain or loss on the position, as in the put-call parity theorem, but it would greatly
complicate the description.60
Your gain of $1452 less $1210, or $242, will be projected back at the unit bond rate
of 10OAone year to the GRD. So you will be treated as having a gain of $220 at the
GRD, As a consequence of your back-projected gain of $220 at the GRD, you will
have a $110 gain tax liability as of that point. The $110 gain tax will be treated as a
loan from the government. You will pay it at the 2-year point, plus deductible interest.
Your gain tax payment at the 2-year point will thusbe$121, of which $11 is
deductible interest.
The extra $220 you are treated as having realized at the GRD will also imply a higher
basis, by $220, for interest imputation from that time forward (one year in this case).
So at the 2-year point you will have total imputed interest received of 10% of $1100
plus $220, or $132, total interest to pay of $3 (on the money we assume you will
borrow to pay the tax at time 1) plus $11 (on the money you are treated as having
borrowed to pay the tax on gain at the GRD); since the interest paid is deductible, you
will have a net income tax liability of 30V0of $132-$14 = $118, or $35.40.
Your position at the 2-year point will then be $1452 (from selling theasset)-$121 (tax
on gain plus interest for the deferral of one year since the GRD)-$33 (repay, with
interest, the money borrowed to pay the income tax at time 1) -$35.40 (income tax at
time 2) = $1262.60, This is the same position you would be in as under the other
scenarios: $1180 x 1.07V0= $1262,60.
. If you realize now, you will realize $1200, for a gain of $200 over your acquisition
cost, which is also your basis. For tax purposes, you will be treated as though the gain
(intlated by the interest rate) actually occurred as a jump a year from now. In the
meantime, you will qualifi for an interest deduction on $200, and you will earn interest61
on the $1200 realized proceeds. So at year end you will have $1320, including $120
in interest earned on your $1200, There will be an imputed interest deduction of $20,
so for tax purposes you will have net interest income of $100, on which you will owe
$30 in income tax. In addition, your gain will be calculated as $200 times 110%,
resulting in $110 in gains tax. The net proceeds will be the same as if you waited to
the GRD to realize: $1320-$30-$110=$1 180.
1~ in this illustrative case, you had chosen the same GTR but a GRD of two years
from now, the results would be different. As in the example, you would be indifferent
whether to realize immediately or at some time before or afier the GRD. But the amount
at the two-year point that would be common to your projections of the consequences of
realizing at different dates would be $1452 (from selling the asset)-$121 (tax on the gain
of $242) -$33 (repay, with interest, the money borrowed to pay the income tax at time 1) -
$32.10 (income tax at time 2on$110 in interest imputed to the adjusted basis at time 1 of
$1100 less $3 in interest paid on borrowing) = 1265.90 instead of $1262.60. The reason
for the difference is that you save on extra basis of $110 that would have come into the
interest imputation calculation at the one-year point if that had been your chosen GRD.
The choice of GRD and GTR thus does “matter” ex post. In the event of a gain,
the outcome with a two-year GRD would be better than with a one-year GRD. Similarly,
in the event of a gain, a lower GTR would be better than a higher GTR. But these plusses
are exactly balanced by the minuses in the event of a loss, Then a later GRD is worse and
a lower GTR is worse.
To spell out how a loss would be handled, take the original fact situation (income
tax rate of 30Y0,interest rate of 10VO,$1000 invested in a share of stock this morning,62
GRD one year from now, and a GTR of 50Yo),except the share falls to $800 in the course
of the day. And suppose you sell immediately. Under the rules, interest is still imputed
for one year on $1000, but you get a deduction for interest imputed on $800, for net
imputed interest of $20. The $800 has, in the meantime earned $80 in interest, so YOU
owe tax of $30 on the sum of imputed and actual interest income. Basis and sales
proceeds are projected to $1100 and $880, respectively, so your loss is treated as $220 at
time 1, saving you $110 in tax. Your net position is then $880 (proceeds of sale of stock
plus interest) -$30 (tax on interest)+ $110 (tax saving due to capital loss, assumed
refinable or otherwise usable to offset other taxes) = $960.
If you wait a year to realize, you can anticipate the asset being worth $880. You
will owe $30 in interest imputed to your basis of $1000, which is adjusted to $1100. You
will have a loss of $220, quali~ing you for $110 in tax savings. Your net position will be
$880 (proceeds of sale of stock) -$30 (tax on imputed interest)+ $110 (tax saving due to
capital loss, assumed refinable or otherwise usable to offset other taxes) = $960.
If you had instead chosen the date of acquisition of the asset as the GRD, you
would have a tax saving at that point of $100 in the case of immediate realization of the
loss. You would then have $900. A year from now you would have $990 less tax of $27
on $90, or $963 (i.e., more than with the later GRD), In the case of waiting a year, you
could anticipate the asset being worth $880. The loss would be back-cast to $200 at the
acquisition date; the tax saving of $100 would be brought forward with (taxable) interest
to year 1. You would also be imputed an interest deduction on $200. Your net position
would be $880 (sales proceeds) + $110 (capital gains tax saving due to loss, plus interest)
-$30 (tax on imputed interest on original basis) -$3 (tax on interest paid on capital gains63
tax saving) + $6 (tax saving due to back-cast adjustment in basis for imputation)= $963.
Similarly, choosing a higher GTR would turn out, afier the fact of a loss, to work to your
advantage.
Comments on the Proposed Au~roach
Both new elements of the proposed approach, the GTR and the GRD, serve the
same finction: to specifi in advance of the resolution of uncertainty the rate of tax that
will apply to the “bet” aspect of an instrument with contingent returns. (The treatment of
the intertemporal aspect is dealt with by the imputation of interest to basis and interest
charges for any postponement of tax payments.) The GTR obviously serves this finction.
But the GRD also plays a role in determining the effective taxation of gains and losses.
The farther in the fiture is the GRD, the greater is the extent of deferral advantage
conferred on winnings (and disadvantage on losses).
Given the option to set the GT~ the option to set the GRD is essentially cosmetic.
Considerations of simplicity and the risk of non-arms length circumstances might argue for
setting the GRD at O(relative to acquisition). This implicitly treats all gain as occurring at
the moment afier acquisition of the asset. A GRD of Oeliminates any problem of
projecting gain or loss from a pre-GRD realization point.
The policy interest in the GTR and GRD is an open question that invites firther
exploration. There is no obvious case for allowing the taxpayer free choice. I have
suggested free choice as an option simply to emphasize the arbitrary role played by these
parameters. If there is the possibility of non-arms length terms of financial instruments, it
might be desirable to impose a requirement of the same GTR and GRD on both sides of a64
bilateral transaction. (A simple way to do this would be to speci~ a uniform GTR and
GRD at the acquisition date.)
A similar obsemation applies to the possible extension of the proposed approach to
positions other than in bilateral financial instruments. The owner of a small business or
piece of real estate, for example, is perhaps best understood as obtaining a form of “labor
income” in gains realized from the enterprise or other property. In such cases, policy
might imply setting the GTR in some appropriate relationship (e.g., equality) with the rate
of tax on compensation.
I have argued that the proposed approach is sufficient to satis~ the requirements
of a linear income-measurement system. An open question is whether, among realization
methods, the proposed approach is necessary, i.e., encompasses all the possibilities. Is
there another realization method that works and cannot be described in terms of the
proposed approach’s GRD and GTR? I believe the answer is no, but I have not proved it.
An interesting instance of this question is the connection of the proposed approach
to the Auerbach method, which we know works. The Auerbach method treats the sales
proceeds on realization as all due to accumulation of gain at the going interest rate since
the acquisition date, Only that gain is subject to tax (with appropriate look-back interest
charges). Although it may, at first sight, appear different (since there is no current
imputation of interest to basis), the Auerbach method is effectively a special case of the
proposed approach, where the GRD is Oand the GTR is also O: gains and losses are taxed65
at a zero rate as though occurring a moment after acquisition; interest is imputed to the
implied basis and taxed in retrospect.20
Treatment of Intermediate Cash Flows
Any cash inflow from the “borrower” to the “lender” side of an instrument (an
interest payment received, for example) between the acquisition date and the time of
realization would result in a reduction to basis. The cash outflow (payment of interest, for
example) would reduce the liability basis of the “borrower”.
Sale of a fractional interest in an instrument could be handled by apportioning the
basis between the interest sold and the interest retained. Treatment of the sale of any
more complex claim to the instrument (selling off the rights to the dividends, for example)
would require more thought. Probably such a transaction would be best treated as the
issue of a new instrument.
The Pro~osed AP~roach and Correctness
Since it relies on imputation of interest, the proposed approach suffers from the
general shortcoming of interest as a measure of income: failure to adjust for inflation. If
inflation-adjustment were implemented, or for the case of no ifiation, the interest
ZOUnder the Auerbach approach, all the imputation of interest takes place retrospectively
at the time of realization, working back to a kind of reconstructed basis from the amount
realized. It does not matter whether the asset is sold at a gain or loss. In the proposed
approach, there is interest imputed from the moment of acquisition, but the basis for
imputing interest is retrospectively adjusted, from the GRD forward, at the time of
realization. So if the GRD is the acquisition date, the effective imputation of interest
occurs as under the Auerbach approach. Since under the Auerbach approach the amount
of gain or loss is irrelevant, the GTR is effectively zero. This is maybe seen in the
continuous-compounding example of footnote 18: if GTR = GRD = O,the only extra tax
at the time of realization is the “correction” to the imputation of interest since acquisition.
This is, effectively, the Auerbach result.66
imputation would produce a correct measure of income for riskless instruments. In fact,
for such instruments, the path of taxable income would be the same as under a mark-to-
market regime.
For risky instruments, however, there would be no comection between the path of
taxable income and the path of market value of the instrument, There would, for one
thing, be a one-time extra liability (or rebate) at the moment of realization (as in the case
of realization with conventional income-tax rules), Furthermore, there would be no
necessary relationship between the discounted value of tax liability under the proposed
system and the path of liability under a mark-to-market regime, Nor could there be, since
there is no observation of an instrument’s market value except at the moments of its
acquisition and sale.
There would, however, be equivalence of the proposed method’s results and those
obtaining under mark-to-market accounting. Offered a choice at the time of acquiring the
asset, the taxpayer should be indifferent between any particular specification of the
proposed method (GTR and GRD) and mark-to-market accounting. (Strictly speaking, to
establish indifference with fill generality requires a sufficiently fill set of contingent
instruments to permit the taxpayer to take any desired position in the risk aspects of an
instrument.) The correctness thus resulting from the proposed method is akin to that that
would be produced by taxation of nominal interest income in a single-tax rate world. The67
outcome for the taxpayers would be the same as that with income correctly measured for
tax purposes, even though the actual flow of tax liabilities would be different.2]
Extending the Analvsis to Uncertain Future Short-Term Rates
The Term Structure of Interest Rates with Uncertain Short-Term Rates
As I have pointed out above, the imputation of the yield to maturity to holders of a
long-term instrument will not, in general, yield the right tax result, where “right” refers to
a result that precludes arbitrage profit opportunities. The exception is the case of short-
term rates that are known to be constant. When the term structure of interest rates results
simply from the variation over time in the short-term rate, but not from uncertainty about
that variation over time, the imputation of the current short-term interest to basis (rather
than yield to maturity) does produce the right result. The holder of a long-term zero-
coupon bond will be filly taxed by the imputation of interest to basis at the going rate.
The adjusted basis on a discount bond will always equal its current market value, so the
effect is the same as a mark-to-market rule.
When, however, the short-term rates are themselves uncertain (even if they are
expected to be constant), this will not, in general, be the case.zz Instead the machinery
21As in that case, to complete the establishment of equivalence from the point of view of
everyone, including the government (representing the rest of the taxpayers), requires the
government to take a position appropriately offsetting that taken by the taxpayer. To
illustrate, in the example of the bets using red and green contracts, if one side of the bet
chooses red and the other green (and both have the same tax rate), the government would
need itself to write a taxable contract on the same event to avoid any net cash flow due to
the bet.
22Profit from buying and selling as the price of longer-term instruments vary with changes
in short-term rates is the main focus of Stmad’s (1995) analysis.68
described in the previous section comes into play and gives rise to taxation of gains and
losses on the instrument that are contingent on the movement of short-term rates,z3
Although it is beyond the reach of this paper to address the issues in depth, I
describe in this section the way the proposed method of taxing financial instruments would
apply to a long-term discount bond when fiture short-term rates are not known. In doing
so, I would reemphasize that the issue is not correctness of the measure in some absolute
sense. Rather, the objective is a linear income measurement system. The theme of the
design of rules is consistency of the taxation of all financial instruments with the taxation
of the duplicating sequence of unit bond transactions.
U.S. income taxation already makes use of standardized interest rates (the
Applicable Federal Rates) for various purposes. These rates are identified for various
terms of the instruments in question. As has been shown, strictly speaking, these rates are
not quite what are called for. The rates observed for contracts of any length blend
different underlying short-term rates that correspond to the simple model’s unit bonds’
interest. Furthermore, the fiture values of those short-term rates are not known with
certainty and the longer-term rates reflect that uncertainty, So they represent a blend of
pure intertemporal returns and risk premia. It is for this reason that I was a bit vague in
referring, in the introductory discussion of tax arbitrage, to the sequence of transactions in
short-term bonds required to duplicate a discount bond for tax arbitrage purposes.
23 Taking into account that the fiture unit bond rates are not known adds (to the unknown
fiture tax rates) another reason to wait until the GRD to complete the taxation of the sale
of an instrument before the GRD. It is likely, however, that the equivalent at the time of
realization could be derived from options prices, I have not tried to work out the details.69
Table 9, Term Structure Illustrated
I Cash Flows to Lender I
Time Point: c1 1 2
Contingency: Heads Tails Heads Tails
Time OUnit Bond -1 1+ rol 1+ rO1
Time 1 Unit Bond -1 -1 1+ rl~ l+q;
Discount Bond I -Z02 I I 1111
Risky Instrument H I –z: I 1 I I I
Risky Instrument T I –z; I I 1 I I
The story is illustrated in Table 9. Here the uncertainty refers to the unknown
interest rate on the time 1 unit bond. The events, “Heads” and “Tails,” referred to in the
columns for times 1 and 2 are the same ones. That is, there is a single coin flip, at time 1,
that determines the short-term interest rate that will prevail between time 1 and time 2.
The two explicitly risky instruments shown in the table pay off at time 1 according to the
same coin flip that determines the interest rate on the time 1 unit bond. (They can be
thought of as options at time Oon the time 1 unit bond interest rate.) Also shown is a
discount bond that pays 1 at time point 2, regardless of the outcome of the coin flip. Its
payoff is not risky, but its value at time 1 is, because that value depends on the coin flip
that determines the short-term interest rate then, At time O,the newspapers would report
rol as the interest on a bond with one-year maturity, and the yield to maturity of the
discount bond, based on its price, zOZ, as the interest on a bond with two-year maturity.
Notice that the actual unit bond interest at time 1, r12,is not known at time 0.
It is not possible to duplicate the cash flows from the discount bond by a planned
sequence of unit bond transactions. If I buy zoztime 1 unit bonds and reinvest the payoff70
from them in time 2 bonds at time 1 the amount I will have at time 2 will not be a certain
amount, but rather an amount that will depend on the outcome of the coin flip, To obtain
a certain return at time 2, other than by buying the discount bond, I must purchase at time
O 1/(1+ rl~) units of risky instrument H and 1/(1+ rl~) units of risky instrument T. By
reinvesting the payoff at time 1 in the time 1 unit bond, a certain outcome of 1 at time 2 is
assured. Thus, if the coin comes up heads at time 1, the payoff from the position in the
package of risky instruments is 1/(1 + rl~) (instrument H pays off 1 per unit, and
instrument T pays off O). Reinvesting the proceeds in the time 1 unit bond generates an
outcome (1/(1 + rl~))(1 + rl~) = 1 at time 2.
For consistency (i.e., to eliminate the potential for arbitrage profit), the tax liability
of the person who takes the direct route to a certain $1 at time 2 by purchasing the
discount bond must be the same as that of one who buys the appropriate duplicating
package of risky instruments and unit bonds through time. The precise meaning of “the
same” merits closer examination, but the condition is clearly met if the cash tax liability is
the same at every point in time and under every contingency.
The fixed point of this situation is the tax treatment of the unit bonds, period by
period. A sequence of cash flows identical to a time Ounit bond can be obtained by
purchasing 1+ rO1units of each of the two risky instruments. An arbitrage profit
opportunity will be available unless the package is taxed the same as the time Ounit bond
(thus integrating the taxpayer’s positions in the two instruments). Applying to the
contingent returns the system discussed in the previous section, using the time Ounit bond
rate to adjust for timing, will produce the desired tax outcome,71
To illustrate the working of the system, start with the condition for financial
market equilibrium in the absence of taxes. Since the outcome is a certain payoff of $1 at
time 1, the position consisting of one unit of each of the risky instruments can be financed
by borrowing the purchase price of the position, z: + z;, in the form of the time Ounit




Now suppose there is a tax and the person in our illustration elects a GRD of time
1 and a GTR of 50V0to apply to the package of risky instruments acquired at time O. In
the case examined here, the uncertainty is resolved at time point 1, when the coin is
flipped. Until then, the instruments increase in value at the time Obond rate. If the prices
are those determined without consideration of taxes, at time 1 the investor will have no
profit apart from possible tax considerations. There will be interest imputed to basis of
(z: + z: )rO,but this will be matched by the deduction of interest paid on the money
borrowed to buy the risky instruments. For tax purposes, the gain at time 1, which is the
chosen GRD, will be the market value of the position, 1, less the adjusted basis,
(z: + z; )(1 + r,,). This difference will be zero if the assumed prices prevail. So they will
be equilibrium prices, and there will be no tax due on the position.
What about the tax results of buying the equivalent to the time 2 discount bond in
the form of the appropriate position in risky instruments, combined with investment of the
payoff at time 1? Suppose again that the tax scheme works and that the pricing in the
absence of taxes prevails in the presence of taxes. Then we know that ( 12 ) holds.
(12) (1/(1 +r,~))z~+(11 (1+rl~)zf = z,,72
Consider the case that the coin comes up heads. Applying the same rules, there is
a taxable gain at time 1 on the position in instrument H equal to ( 13 )
(13) (1/(1 + r~;))(l - 2((1 +~ol))
and a gain (negative) on the position in instrument T equal to ( 14 )
(14) (1/(1 +r;))(o - 2;(1 +~~~))
for a net taxable gain overall of ( 15).
(15) (1/(1 +r;))(l - 2:(1 +ro,)) + (1/ (1+ r,;))(-z;(l +~o,))
In general, the net of the two gains will not be zero and a tax payment or refind, at
the GT~ will be due.
Applying the same method to the time 2 discount bond would have the same tax
consequences, given the same choice of GRD and GT~ if the bond were sold at time 1,
with the proceeds reinvested in the time 1 unit bond. It may be less obvious that the result
will be the same i~ instead, the bond is held until maturity. Under the rules, and still
assuming the coin comes up heads, the interest rate used for imputing income to the
bondholder will be rol in the first period and rl~ in the second. At time 2 the bondholder
will be treated as having gain 1– 202(1+ rol)(l + q;). The gain will be “discounted” to
time point 1, treated as
(l-zoz(l+ro~)(l +q;))
at that point, We can substitute the
1+ rl~





+)2; + (+)2:))(1 + r,] ) “
12 12 12
+(1 - z:)(1 + rO,)- (*)z;(l +~ol)
12 1273
which will be seen to be identical to ( 15 ), the gain on the position in the risky instruments
used in the duplicating sequence of transactions. The results are thus the same, afier all
taxes, of holding the time 2 discount bond and the equivalent sequence of a package of
risky instruments at time Ofollowed by reinvestment of the proceeds at time 1 to obtain a
certain $1 at time 2.
VI. Conclusion
The approach to realization in the existing income taxation of financial instruments
renders inevitable the complexities I describe as nonlinearity. In a general sense, this is
well known. I have suggested that the fundamental difficulty is dealing with the
intertemporal aspects of income accounting (the reward to waiting) rather than the
challenges of uncertainty (the reward to risk-bearing). The present analysis implies that
the intertemporal problems maybe more serious than may have been thought (as reflected
in shortcomings of the rules for instruments with fixed and determinate returns), whereas
the treatment of risk (the rules for contingent returns) is in a sense simple.
It is, however, the element of uncertainty that gives rise to realization accounting,
We cannot record what we do not yet know. In this paper I conclude that the only
approaches that would make realization accounting “work” involve virtually universal
application of “the retrospective allocation of gain” and, especially, “the imputation of
interest at a standard rate” alluded to by Warren.
In the world of zero transactions cost examined in this paper, there is no substitute
for nonlinearity of the income measurement system (such as the limit on the deduction of
capital losses) barring near-universal application of “interest at a standard rate” to basis,
retrospectively if need be. The only instruments for which what is labeled “interest” in the74
contract is the amount subject to tax are the unit bonds. These are the default-risk free
instruments against which tax arbitrage is constructed, (I do not think these “standard”
instruments need to be free of risk, default or otherwise, but it would greatly complicate
the story to spell out why.) For all the other instruments, including most of those
presently regarded as unproblematic (fixed-return assets), either mark-to-market taxation
or imputation of interest to basis is required. Furthermore, since essentially all other
instruments are risky, relative to the unit bonds, for all other instruments, either mark-to-
market taxation or the realization rules described in this paper must be applied,
One implication is that, if it is desired to have a linear income measurement system,
considerations of transactions cost must enter the design of rules. Another, more radical,
thought is suggested. Assuming the taxation of interest income is regarded as worth the
candle, perhaps consideration should be given to truly universal application of a
standardized rate of return to basis (with the sort of realization rules described in this
paper). There would be no taxation of interest as observed in the market (no unit bonds).
That would make it a simple matter to adjust basis for inflation, and probably come very
much closer to a true income tax than is presently achieved by our hybrid rules.75
Appendix: AContinuous-Discounting Version of the Proposed Rules
Some readers may find helpfil a demonstration using continuous discounting that
the proposed rules render the taxpayer indifferent to the timing of realization when it is
assumed that the asset in question will increase in value at the unit bond yield. Consider
the taxpayer’s decision to postpone realization from some time, S, to some fiture time,s’.
(To simplifi matters, assume that both times are after the GRD for the instrument in
question. The mathematical expressions developed in this appendix apply as well for a
realization before the GRD,) As outlined in footnote 18, in the case of realization at a
times, an extra dollar realized implies an extra gain tax liability at the realization date of
1– (1 – GTR)e-m’(S-GRD), where there is continuous compounding at a constant interest
rate, r, and where a constant marginal tax rate, m, is assumed.
If an asset has value V(s) at times, the path of its value at fiture time, s‘, accruing
at the unit bond rate, is described by V(s)er(s’-S) (assuming throughout no cash flow
from the asset), If the asset follows this path, the amount of capital gain as of the GRD
will be unchanged by postponing realization. The extra tax due at a fiture realization date
will rise, since there will be more postponement of liability to make up, Suppose, for
example, that the current adjusted basis in the asset is B(s), so that the gain, reckoned at
the GRD, is
X - (V(s)- B(s))e-r(S-Gm)
which is also the extra basis subject to interest imputation upon realization. Then
the gain tax as of the GRD is GTR”X, This translates into extra tax due at the hypothetical76
later realization date of GTR.xe(l-m)r(’’-G~) ,where the liability cumulates at the afier-
tax interest rate (since interest paid on postponed tax payments is deductible).
The extra interest imputation follows the path rXer(*-Gm) starting at t = Gm and
running up to the realization date,s’. This, in turn, implies an extra flow of tax liability at
time tbetweens ands’ of mrXer(l-Gw), which must be brought forward and paid ats’,







= xer(~’-GD) (~ _ e-mr(~’-c~)) .
Putting the two pieces together, the total tax “pulse” ats’ is
xer(s’-GRD) ~ ( _ e-rnr(S’-G~) + GTRe-rn’(S’-G~))
= Xe’(S’-Gm)(l- (1- GTR)e-m’(S’-Gm)).
The extra afier-tax cash flow at tdue to waiting untils’ to realize is the tax on
interest imputed to basis,
–mrB(s)e’(l-S)
for trunning froms tos’. The net gain from waiting froms tos’ is the discounted value
(tos, at the afier-tax rate) of this flow of tax payments and the pulse of realized proceeds
of sale ats’ less the pulse of extra tax payments due ats’,
js’(-mr~(s)er(t-s))e-(’-m)r(t-s)~,+
(V(s)er(s’-s) _x~r(s’-G~)(l _{~_GTR)e-mr(s’-G~) ))e-(~-m)r(s’-s)
less the foregone cash flow (net of taxes) that would have been obtained from realization
ats,77
V(s) - Xer(s-Gm)((l -(1 - GTR)e-mr(s-GM))
If this total is positive, it pays to postpone realization, If it is negative, it pays to
realize immediately. By laborious algebra, making use of the fact that, by definition of X,
V(s) – Xer(s-Gm) = B(s) this expression for the net current cash flow equivalent ats of
waiting to realize froms tos’ reduces to
V(s)(l – emr(s’-s)) _ xer(’-G~)(l _ e-mr(~’-s)) +
v(s)emr(~’-~) _ xer(~’-GRD+(l-~)~) (1 _ (1 _ GTR)e-mr(’’-Gm)) +
–V(s) + Xer(S-GD)(1-(1 - GTR)e-m’(S-GD)
which equals, on collection of terms,
V(s)(l – e“’’(’’-’) + em’(s’-s) – 1)+
+Xe‘(S-GRD) ((1 - GTR)e-”r(’-GD) - (1- GTR)e-m’(S-Gm)- (1- e-~r(’’-s)+ e-mr(’’-’)- 1))
=078
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